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On May 5, 2020, the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC)
challenged the validity of a European Central Bank bond buying project.'
In the bureaucratic language of its press release, the GFCC "granted
several constitutional complaints directed against the Public Sector
Purchase Programme (PSPP) of the European Central Bank." 2 The GFCC
ruling drew considerable attention because it flatly contradicted the
European Court of Justice (ECJ),3 which, in an earlier episode of this
litigation, had already upheld the program.4 According to the GFCC, the

1.

BVerfG, 2 BvR 859/15, May 5, 2020, http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20200505_2bvr08591

5en.html.
2.
Press Release No. 32/2020, BVerfG, ECB Decisions on the Public Sector Purchase
Programme Exceed EU Competences (May 5, 2020), availableat https://www.bundesverfassungs
gericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2020/bvg20-032.html.
3.
See, e.g., Martin Arnold & Tommy Stubbington, German Court Threatens to Thwart

ECB in Buying Bonds to Ease Crisis,FIN.

TIMES,

May 6, 2020, at

1; German ConstitutionalCourt

Rules the Court of Justice's Weiss Judgment Ultra Vires Due to Poor Reasoning and Weak
Standard of Review, EU L. LVE (May 5, 2020), https://eulawlive.com/german-constitutionalcourt-rules-the-court-of-justices-weiss-judgment-ultra-vires-due-to-poor-reasoning-and-weakstandard-of-review/ ("For the first time in its history, the German Federal Constitutional Court has
declared a judgment of the Court of Justice (C-493/17, Weiss and Others), and Decisions of the
European Central Bank (ECB), ultra vires and not applicable in Germany .... ").

4.

Case C-493/17, Weiss and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1000 (Dec. 11, 2018). After a

thirteen-month delay, the European Commission has responded to the GFCC's defiance of the ECJ
ruling, by suing Germany for infringement of its obligations under EU law. See Mehreen Khan,
"Germany Hit by Brussels' Legal Action," FIN. TIMES, June 10, 2021, at 2 (reporting that the
European Commission has launched an infringement proceeding against Germany); Consolidated
Version ofthe Treaty on the Functioningof the European Union art. 260, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J.
(C 326) 161 [hereinafter TFEU] (discussing the Commission's authority to bring such an action,
which may result in imposition of a monetary penalty on the member state).
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ECJ had not adequately justified its approval of the ECB bond purchases,
as required by the Treaty on European Union (TEU).5
6
This Article is not concerned with the merits of the GFCC's ruling,
7
or its practical impact, which is probably nil. My topic involves the
GFCC's assertion of the authority to defy the ECJ.8 The ECJ has long held
that member state courts do not have the power to rule on issues of EU
law, much less repudiate ECJ rulings, and in particular that member state
courts "do not have the power to declare acts of the Community
institutions invalid." 9 The GFCC's contrary ruling in Weiss invites
The GFCC said that the ECJ's ruling had not demonstrated that the ECB's program
5.
was proportional to the need for it, thus, the ECJ ruling violated the "principle of proportionality,"
a bedrock doctrine in EU law. BVerfG, May 5, 2020, 2 BvR 859/15, paras. 71-100; see also TAKIS
TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 136 (2d ed. 2006) ("The principle of
proportionality and its function in Community law."). For discussions of the GFCC's holding, see,
e.g., Philip M. Bender, Ambivalence of Obviousness-Remarks to the Decision of the Federal
Constitutional Court of Germany of May 5, 2020 (Max Planck Inst. for Tax L. & Pub. Fin.,
Working Paper No. 9, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract-3661607; Julian Nowag, The BVerfG's
ProportionalityReview in the PSPPJudgmentand its Link to Ultra Vires and ConstitutionalCore:
Solange Babel's Tower Has Not Been Finalised, LUND U. LEGAL RES. PAPER SERIES (June 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3634218.
For a discussion of the disagreement between the GFCC and the European Court of
6.
Justice over judicial review of the ECB's actions, see Annelieke Mooij & Stefania Baroncelli, What
Kind ofJudicialReview for the European CentralBank? (BRIDGE Network, Working Paper No.
4
9, 2020), https://ssrn./com/abstract-374524 ; see also CE Ass., Apr. 21, 2021, No. 393099,
https://www.conseil-etat.fr/fr/arianeweb/CE/decision/2021-04-21/393099 (ruling by the French
Conseil d'Etat, rejecting the GFCC's position on this issue).
See Martin Arnold & Guy Chazan, Bundesbank to Keep Buying Bonds After Court
7.
Challenge, FIN. TIMES (July 5, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/99447f2I-46db-465b-8ed09a214a898a74. It is also noteworthy, however, that the ECB seemed to acknowledge an obligation
to meet the GFCC's "proportionality" objections to its program by documenting the need for the
bond buying. See Martin Arnold, ECB Seeks to Defuse Row with German Court over Bond-Buying,
FIN. TIMES (June 25, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/7f2172f5-0118-484a-a394-7c95f827bdeb
(noting how, prior to GFCC's order, the ECB's governing council debated "whether its bondbuying excessively impinged on economic and financial policy").
See Nik de Boer & Jens van't Klooster, The ECB, the Courts and the Issue of
8.
DemocraticLegitimacy After Weiss, 57 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1689, 1689 (2020) (describing the
GFCC ruling as a "highly controversial decision ... [that] strikes at the heart of the EU legal
order"); see also Ana Bobi6 & Mark Dawson, MakingSense of the "Incomprehensible": The PSPP
Judgment of the German Federal ConstitutionalCourt, 57 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1953 (2020)
(discussing the GFCC's holding that PSPP is irrelevant because it was, in respect of the principle
of proportionality, incomprehensible and ultra-vires).
Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lubeck-Ost, 1987 E.C.R. 4225; see KOEN
9.
LENAERTS, IGNACE MASELIS & KATHLEEN GUTMAN, EU PROCEDURAL LAW 51 (2014) [hereinafter

LMG] ("Divergences of view between courts in the Member States as to the validity of acts of
Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies would be liable to place in jeopardy the very unity
of the Union legal order and detract from the fundamental requirement of legal certainty."); see
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discussion of the role of member state courts in the interpretation and
application of EU law.
In the United States, a dispute like the one between the GFCC and
the ECJ would be resolved quickly. The Supreme Court possesses the
means to easily repudiate an analogous state court ruling and would surely
do so. Since 1789, a federal statute has authorized the Supreme Court to
review state court judgments that depend on federal law.' 0 The loser at the
state court level would appeal the state court decision and the Supreme
Court would promptly reverse." The Supreme Court would compel
compliance with its mandate, under threat of sanctions." But these
solutions are impossible in the European Union because there is no
network of lower EU courts and the ECJ has no jurisdiction to hear appeals
from decisions of member state courts.
Instead, ECJ control over the content of EU law is addressed by a
different means, in Article 267 of the Treaty on Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU). When an unsettled issue of EU law comes up in
litigation in a member state court, the judge may make a "preliminary
reference" to the ECJ. 3 If the "question is raised in a case pending before
a court or tribunal of a member state against whose decisions there is no
judicial remedy under national law," the reference is mandatory. " But the
ECJ, having answered the question with a "preliminary ruling," has no
further role in the litigation. For example, the GFCC's May 5 ruling is just
one step in continuing litigation. 5 Years prior, the GFCC made a
also Paul R. Dubinsky, The Essential Function of FederalCourts: The European Union and the
United States Compared, 42 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 295, 318-20 (1993) (discussing Foto-Frost).

10. 28 U.S.C.
73, 85-86).

§ 1257 (originally enacted as the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat.

11.
See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (addressing state officials' defiance of
the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), abolishing
segregated public education). In Cooper, the Court, in an opinion signed by all nine Justices, ruled
that "the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case
is the supreme law of the land," and that "[n]o state legislator or executive or judicial officer can
war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it." Id. at 18.
12. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 476-77 (7th ed. 2015) (noting, in the context of state court judgments, the
U.S. Supreme Court's authority to issue a writ of mandamus "as a means of obtaining compliance"
and remedies for mandate defiance). In the United States, a challenge to federal government actions
like ECB bond purchasing would probably not be litigated in state court in the first place because
the United States and its officers are authorized to remove such under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).
13.
TFEU, supra note 4, at art. 267.
14.
Id.

15.

See MARTIN BROBERG & NIELS FENGER, PRELIMINARY REFERENCES TO THE EUROPEAN

COURT OF JUSTICE 441 (2d ed. 2014) ("[T]he preliminary ruling constitutes merely an interim stage
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preliminary reference and the ECJ upheld the European Central Bank's
program against Treaty-based objections.1 6 The May 5, 2020 GFCC
decision rejects the ECJ's interpretation of the TEU. Since "[t]here are no
provisions of EU law governing the subsequent continuation of these
proceedings," 7 the ECJ now has no opportunity to override the GFCC.
This episode is an especially vivid illustration of a larger theme.
Some member state courts, like Belgium and Luxembourg, make
preliminary references at a much higher rate than others, such as France
and Germany.'" The disparity among member state courts strongly
suggests that, notwithstanding Article 267, some courts prefer to decide
EU issues for themselves rather than seek answers from the ECJ. One need
not resort to statistical anomalies to detect the variations. Experts in EU
law have closely examined the enforcement of EU law in member state
courts.1 9 Most member states include a "constitutional court," similar to
the GFCC, in their judicial systems. 20 The principal role of a constitutional
court is, as the name suggests, to adjudicate issues of fundamental law
referred by other branches of the judiciary.2 The tendency to decline to
refer EU issues to the ECJ is especially pronounced among these
constitutional courts,22 so much so that the German Law Journalrecently
devoted a symposium issue to the practice in 2015.23
in the national proceedings which continue after the Court's ruling having regard to the clarification
of EU law that has now been established.").

16.
17.
18.

19.

See Case C-493/17, Weiss and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1000 (Dec. 11, 2018).
BROBERG & FENGER, supra note 15.
Id. at 38 tbl.2.2a.
See, e.g., 1 XXIX F6D RATION INTERNATIONALE POUR LE DROrT EUROPAEN CONG.,

NATIONAL COURTS AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF EU LAW: THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF NATIONAL COURTS

IN THE EU LEGAL ORDER (Marleen Botman & Jurian Langer eds., 2020).
See Jan Komarek, National Constitutional Courts in the European Constitutional
20.
Democracy, 12 INT' LJ. CONST. L. 525, 533 n.39 (2014) ("The following EU Member States have
concentrated constitutional courts: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic,
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain.").
21.

HERBERT JACOB ET AL., COURTS, LAW, AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

308-09 (1996) (discussing "constitutional courts" in general and the German version in particular).
See, e.g., Tommaso Pavone & R. Daniel Kelemen, The Evolving JudicialPolitics of
22.
EuropeanIntegration:The European Court ofJusticeandNational Courts Revisited, 25 EuR. L.J.
352 (2019); Daniele Gallo, ChallengingEU ConstitutionalLaw: The ItalianConstitutionalCourt's
New Stance on Direct Eflect and the PreliminaryReference Procedure, 25 EUR. L.J. 434 (2019).
See Fruzsina Gardos-Orosz, PreliminaryReference and the HungarianConstitutional
23.
Court: A Context of Non-Reference, 16 GER. L.J. 1569 (2015); Viorica Vita, The Romanian
ConstitutionalCourt and the Principle of Primacy: To Refer or Not to Refer?, 16 GER. L.J. 1623
(2015); Eva Julia Lohse, The German ConstitutionalCourt and Preliminary References-,Still a
Match Not Made in Heaven?, 16 GER. L.J. 1491 (2015).
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One way to study alternatives to the current jurisdictional regime is
to focus on technical issues of caseload management. 24 That approach,
however, does not necessarily capture all of the issues that deserve
attention. In a federal system, the allocation ofjurisdiction between federal
and state courts also raises issues of federal-state relations. In this Article,
I argue these federalism-related questions can be illuminated by taking a
comparative approach. My aim is to show that the study of an analogous
system of judicial federalism-the United States'-may yield insights
into the advantages and disadvantages of both the EU's approach and
alternatives to it.25 In particular, federal court control of federal law is a
central principle of U.S. judicial federalism. In light of this central
principle, the gap between the system envisioned in Article 267 and the
actual practices of member state courts deserves attention because the
systematic failure to refer denies the ECJ the ability to determine the
content of EU law. The inevitable result is that, to the extent EU policies
depend on the member states and their courts for implementation, the EU's
ability to achieve its aims is undermined.
The European Union is a work in progress. According to its basic
treaty, the EU's long-term goal is "an ever closer union among the peoples
of Europe," 26 a project that requires stronger bonds among the member
states, a shared commitment to EU policies, and judicial institutions that
can effectively implement those goals. The United States pursued a similar
project, beginning with the drafting and ratification of the constitution in
1787-88, and furthered by the Union victory in the Civil War and the
ratification of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments
shortly afterwards.27 Both the United States and the European Union are
federal polities comprised of member states that entered the union with
their own legal systems, including a judiciary, already in place. In both,
24. See, e.g., Paul Craig, The Jurisdictionof the Community Courts Reconsidered,36 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 555, 557 (2001) (discussing proposals for reforming the EU's judicial structure and "the
broader implications and consequences of particular jurisdictional reforms," but doing so from a
strictly internal EU perspective).
25.
The United States is an apt comparator because, unlike many federal systems, the
United States and the European Union both divide sovereignty between the "federal" and state
levels. See Michael L. Wells, JudicialFederalism in the European Union, 54 HOUSTON L. REV.

697, 719-24 (2017) (discussing the "shared and differentiating features" of the U.S. and the EU
systems ofjudicial federalism).
26.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 1, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J.

(C326) 16 [hereinafter TEU].
27.

See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN

CONSTITUTION 253 (1990) ("[T]he constitutional system took its final form only after the Civil
War.").
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the new federal government added an overlay of federal law on the preexisting body of state law. In both, the member states retain control of state
law, while they grant authority over federal law to the central government.
In both, many litigated disputes present both federal and state issues. Both
unions began with comparatively weak central governments. In the United
States, the central government grew stronger over the years, achieving the
closer union to which the TEU aspires. But the United States'
strengthening central government has also retained a significant role for
the fifty states. For these reasons, the history of American judicial
federalism is a useful source of information, rationales, pitfalls, and
grounds for caution in considering reform of the preliminary reference.
Part II of this Article compares the basic features of U.S. federalism
with those of the EU. One commonality, a critical one for the study of ECJ
control of EU law, is that both the United States and the European Union
have expanded over time, in two distinct ways. The number of member
states has grown from thirteen to fifty in the United States and from six to
twenty-seven in the European Union. In addition, both central
governments have increased their authority over areas of law originally
left to the member states. In the United States, Congress has acted under
its powers, mainly derived from Article I of the Constitution, to regulate
nearly every aspect of daily life.2 8 As membership has increased, the sheer
volume of litigation over EU law has grown exponentially, and EU law
has expanded to cover the environment, consumer protection, "all the
issues of the area of freedom, security and justice, including criminal law
harmonization and citizenship of the EU and, no less important, the
29
constitutional issues of fundamental rights protection."
These changes present a problem for the authoritative resolution of
issues of EU law. Parts III and IV discuss two alternatives to current
practice. Both draw on U.S. judicial institutions and both generate costs,
measured by their inroads on state autonomy, as well as benefits, which
consist mainly of more effective enforcement of EU norms and greater
integration among the member states. One alternative, discussed in Part
III, is to install a network of lower EU courts for adjudication of EU issues,
similar to the U.S. federal court system. This reform might be
accomplished without amending the TEU, depending on how Article 19's

For discussion of the case law tracking the growth of Congressional power, see NOAH
28.
R. FELDMAN & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 113-39 (19th ed. 2016).
29. See Tamara Capeta, EU Judiciary in Need of Reform?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON

EU INSTITUTIONAL LAw 268 (A. Lazowski & Steven Blockmans eds., 2016).
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authorization of "specialised courts" is interpreted. 30 The principal
advantage of this approach is that, at least in theory, EU judicial
institutions could more effectively control the content of EU law. But that
strong point may be more theoretical than practical, as EU issues would
continue to surface in member state litigation. In addition, the cost of such
a scheme would be great, as the role of the member state judiciaries would

be diminished.
Part IV discuses a more promising alternative, at least for the shortto medium-term. In place of, or in addition to preliminary reference, the
TFEU would be amended to give the ECJ appellate jurisdiction to review
member state rulings on EU law. The analogy here is to U.S. Supreme
Court review of state court rulings on matters of federal law. This, like the
Part III alternative, involves a federalism cost in the sense that the member
state courts would be subject to correction by the ECJ. On the other hand,
that cost would be ameliorated by a corresponding benefit: their rulings on
EU law would be accorded a legitimacy currently denied to them by TFEU
Article 267, which fails to recognize a role for the member state courts in
the project of building a stronger European Union because it tells them
that they have no role in making EU law. At the same time, appellate
review assures the ECJ of more control over the content of EU law than
current practice permits.
Thus, I propose EU adoption of two U.S. judicial institutionsmember state court adjudication of EU law coupled with ECJ reviewbut reject the U.S. network of lower federal courts. Why might one draw
this distinction? Despite their similarities, the United States and the
European Union will probably always differ in the relative strengths of
their central and member state governments. The United States is a
comparatively weak federal system, with the federal government holding
most of the power, while the European Union is a strong one, with the

30.
See TEU, supra note 26, art. 19 ("The Court of Justice of the European Union shall
include the Court of Justice, the General Court and specialised courts."). The General Court's main
role is to rule on businesses' appeals from regulatory actions taken against them by the European
Commission. See ROGER J. GOEBEL ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 60

(4th ed. 2015) (noting how the ECJ transfers to the General Court "appeals from Commission
decisions in enforcing competition rules and from Council and Commission regulations imposing
anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties"). For a more detailed breakdown of the General Court's
jurisdiction, see LMG, supra note 9, at 43-44. At present the only "specialised court" is the
European Civil Service Tribunal, which adjudicates disputes between the EU and employees of the

EU. Id. at 33.
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member states in charge.3 1 Comparisons between the United States and the
European Union account for the differences, which can explain and justify
diverse approaches. At least for the time being, the case for a Union-wide
EU judiciary is weaker than in the United States. But comparisons should
also focus on the similarities. The value of a federal forum to resolve
federal issues is strong in both systems, despite the comparatively greater
strength of the EU's member states.
II.

COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL FEDERALISM: THE EUROPEAN
AND THE UNITED STATES

UNION

In federal systems, like the United States and the European Union,32
two sovereigns each produce a body of law. Any piece of litigation may
raise both federal and state law issues. Two sets of courts-national and
local-compete for jurisdiction over these hybrid disputes. "Judicial
federalism" is the body of law that allocates judicial power between the
two sets of courts. In both systems, the division of judicial power between
federal and state governments has been a major source of conflict between
federal and state judicial power since the beginning of the republic.
A.

JudicialFederalismin the UnitedStates

At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, the delegates were united
on the need for a federal "Supreme Court" to ultimately decide issues of

&

See Wells, supra note 25, at 719-24. Compare, for example, U.S. and EU fiscal
31.
responses to COVID-19. Member States take the initiative in the EU, see, e.g., Bojan Pancevski
Laurence Norman, How Angela Merkel's ChangeofHeartDrove HistoricEU Rescue Plan, WALL
ST. J. (July 21, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/angela-merkel-macron-covid-coronavirus-eurescue-I1595364124. In the United States, Congress is in charge, see, e.g., Deirdre Walsh,

CongressPasses $900 Billion CoronavirusReliefBill, EndingMonths-Long Stalemate, NPR (Dec.
21, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/12/21/948862052/house-passes-900-billion-coronavirusrelief-bill-ending-months-long-stalemate.
This Article treats the European Union as a federal system because it divides power
32.
between the federal level (the EU) and the Member states. See Koen Lenaerts, Federalism:
Essential Concepts in Evolution-The Case of the European Union, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 746,
748 (1997) ("Federalism, as a means of structuring the relationship between interlinked authorities,
can be used either within or without the framework of a nation-state."). For a stricter definition of
federalism, which requires that "the federation as a whole claims universal and exclusive
sovereignty within its territory and in its external relations," see KAARLO TUoRI, EUROPEAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 345 (2015). According to Tuori, "[i]t should be evident that the European
Union is not a federation in this standard sense." Id.
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federal law,33 but disagreed over whether lower federal courts were
needed. 34 The advocates of a strong federal government, called
"federalists" in the early United States, sought a powerful federal judicial
system. Their localist opponents, called "anti-federalists," tried to retain
authority for state governments and courts.35 They resolved the dispute by
leaving the role of federal courts up to Congress. Article III of the U.S.
Constitution provides that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." 36 Congress set up
a network of lower federal courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789.37 The 1789
statute authorized the federal courts to adjudicate federal criminal cases,
admiralty cases, and suits involving the United States. 38 It also authorized
U.S. Supreme Court review of state court judgments that turn on federal
issues where the state court ruled against the federal claimant. 39
It soon became apparent that debates over the scope of federal
judicial power would persist, 40 but neither side managed to prevail
consistently. The Federalists held power in the early years of the republic,
but they lost the 1800 election on both the presidential and congressional
levels. Before leaving office, the outgoing Federalist Congress expanded

33.

U.S. CONST.

art. III,

§

1;

see JULIUS GOEBEL JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF

THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO

1801,

196-250 (Stanley Katz ed., 2009)

(discussing the background of Article III).
34.

See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW

7 (1973)

(explaining how "ardent pro-Constitutionalists" insisted that "all original jurisdiction ... be vested
entirely in the courts of the state"); FALLON ET AL., supranote 12, at 7-8 (highlighting Rutledge and
Madison's disagreement over creating a system of lower federal courts).
35.
For a discussion of the debates between the two across a range of issues, see DAN T.
COENEN, THE STORY OF THE FEDERALIST: How MADISON AND HAMILTON RECONCEIVED AMERICA

(2007). Coenen focuses on the Federalist papers, written in support of a strong federal state. For an
introduction to the anti-federalist view, see THE ANTI-FEDERALIST: WRITINGS BY THE OPPONENTS
OF THE CONSTITUTION (Herbert Storing ed., 1985).
36. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.

37.

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,

§§ 2-4, 1 Stat. 73, 73-75. For a discussion of the

background of this statute, see Michael G. Collins, The Federal Courts, the First Congress, and
the Non-Settlement of 1789, 91 VA. L. REv. 1515 (2005) (noting the persistence of sharp disputes
over the role of federal courts).

38.
39.

Judiciary Act of 1789,
Id. § 25.

§ 9.

40.
See Alison LaCroix, Federalists, Federalism, and FederalJurisdiction,30 L. & HIST.
REV. 205, 215-16 (2012) ("One of the central points of disagreement concerning the jurisdiction of
the lower federal courts in the early Republic was the structural relationship between the judicial
and legislative powers of the United States.").
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federal jurisdiction to the outer boundaries of Article 1II,4 1 only to have the
statute repealed shortly afterward by a new congressional majority that
favored stronger state governments. 42 In 1812, the Supreme Court curbed
federal judicial power by holding that the federal courts could not
"exercise a common law jurisdiction in criminal cases,"4 3 thus leaving
most criminal law to the state courts. In 1816, the Court took a different
tack, upholding its authority to review state court judgments in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee." In the course of Hunter's Lessee's opinion, Justice
Joseph Story identified several policies served by Supreme Court review,
including concern "that state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies,
and state interests, might sometimes obstruct ... the regular administration
of justice," 45 "the importance, and even necessity of uniformity of
decisions throughout the whole United States,"6 and providing access to
a federal forum.4 7
Several years later, in Osborn v. Bank of the UnitedStates, the Court
broadly construed the Article III "arising under" jurisdiction of the federal
courts. 48 Writing for the Court in Osborn, Chief Justice John Marshall set
forth principles that have since guided U.S. judicial federalism. Chief
Justice Marshall asserted that "the legislative, executive, and judicial
powers, of every well-constructed government, are co-extensive with each
other.' It follows that "[a]ll governments which are not extremely
defective in their organization, must possess, within themselves, the
means of expounding, as well as enforcing, their own laws." 0 Any case
that contained a federal "ingredient," which means a federal element that

Id. at 207 n.4 (referring to the passage of An Act to Provide for the More Convenient
41.
Organization of the Courts of the United States, § 11, 2 Stat. 89 (1801), otherwise known as the

Judiciary Act of 1801). Id. at 208, 212.
42. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 26-27 (discussing how "incoming Jeffersonians
repealed [the Judiciary Act of 1801]").
United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32 (1812); see also United States v.
43.
Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415, 416 (1816) (ruling as in Hudson, but noting a "difference of
opinion ... still exists, among the members of the court").
...

44.

14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264

(1821) (upholding Supreme Court authority to hear appeals from state criminal convictions).
Martin, 14 U.S. at 347.
45.

46.

Id. at 347-48.

47. See id. at 348-49 (emphasizing that access to federal court, namely federal removal,
helps prevent the scenario where a "plaintiff ... always elect[s] the state court" to deprive a
defendant "of all the security which the constitution intended in aid of his rights").

48.
49.
50.

Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
Id. at 818.
Id. at 818-19.
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may or may not be at issue in the litigation, passes Article III muster for
federal jurisdiction.
Osborn permits, but does not require, expansive federal jurisdiction.
Exercising its Article III powers, Congress has generally made federal
courts available "for vindication of those interests which, because the
Congress has considered them of national importance, have become the
subject of the federal substantive law." 52 Article III and Osborn laid the
foundation for a complex body of jurisdictional law. Congress and the
Supreme Court have developed a jurisdictional system in which virtually
every case that turns on federal law can either be brought in the lower
federal courts or reviewed by the Supreme Court. State courts, however,
also have a significant role in adjudicating federal issues. When the federal
issue arises as a defense to a state law claim, or as an element in a state
case, it will typically be decided by a state court, not by a lower federal
court. 53 The Supreme Court may review a state judgment that presents a
federal issue, but not if the state ruling rests on "adequate and
independent" state grounds."
Overall, the important takeaways from this history are that (1) the
United States has had a network of lower federal courts since 1789;
(2) ongoing competition between federal and state judicial power has
resulted in a division of authority, not complete domination by either;
(3) federal courts possess the means to control the content of federal law,
but state courts also have a role in adjudicating federal issues; and (4) the
Supreme Court may review any state court judgment that depends on
federal law. Taken together, these features sharply distinguish the U.S.
system of judicial federalism from that of the EU.
B.

PreliminaryRulings by the ECJ

The European Union judiciary is smaller and weaker than the federal
judiciary in the United States." Unlike the nation-wide system of federal
courts in the United States, there is no network of lower EU courts. Article

51.

See Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904

&

(1824) (decided along with Osborn); LaCroix, supra note 40, at 227-28 (describing the facts and
disposition of Planters'Bankand Osborn); infra Section IH.A (discussing Osborn in more detail).
52.
Herbert Wechsler, FederalJurisdictionand the Revision of the JudicialCode, 13 L.
CONTEMP. PROBS. 216,238 (1948).
53.
See, e.g., Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013) (federal element in state cause of
action); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (federal defense).

54.

See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207,210 (1935).

55.

For a comprehensive description of the system, see LMG, supra note 9, at 13-47.
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19 of the TEU provides that "[t]he Court of Justice of the European Union
shall include the Court of Justice, the General Court and specialized
courts."56 The only specialized court yet created is a "civil service court,"
which decides disputes between the EU and its own employees. The
General Court's main role is to review decisions by the European
Commission, a powerful administrative agency that enforces competition
law (i.e., antitrust law).57 The highest court, the European Court of Justice,
consists of one Justice from each member state typically chosen by the
government of the member state.i Justices serve for six-year terms and
may be reappointed. According to the TEU, the role of the ECJ is to
"ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is
observed." 59 The ECJ has original jurisdiction over suits involving
member states as plaintiffs or defendants. 60 As plaintiffs, the member
states sue EU institutions, claiming that they have overstepped their
bounds under the treaties. As defendants, the member states are sued by
the Commission, on the ground that the member state is liable for
"infringement" of its obligations under the treaties.61 In addition, the ECJ
exercises appellate review over rulings by the General Court.
None of these three EU courts hears appeals from member state
courts. The TFEU sets up a different process for the ECJ to resolve issues
of EU law that arise in the member state courts. Article 267 of the TFEU
provides that "any court or tribunal of a Member State ... may, if it
considers that a decision on [a question of EU law] is necessary to enable
62
it to give judgment, request the Court to give a ruling thereon." If the EU
issue arises in litigation in a member state court "against whose decisions
there is no judicial remedy under national law," the Treaty states that the
court "shall" make a reference. 63 According to the CJEU, this language

56. TEU, supra note 26, art. 19; see KOEN LENAERTS & PIET VAN NUFFEL, EUROPEAN
UNION LAW 523-38 (Robert Bray & Nathan Cambien eds., 3d ed. 201.1) (detailing the CJEU's
purpose and establishment, jurisdiction, composition, procedure, and internal organization).
For descriptions of the work of the European Commission, see LENAERTS & VAN
57.
NUFFEL, supra note 56, at 505-22; DICK LEONARD, GUIDE TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 47-53 (9th ed.
2005).
See GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 55 ("The Court of Justice consists of one Judge
58.
designated by each Member state ... ").
TEU, supra note 26, art. 19.
59.
LENAERTS & VAN NUFFEL, supra note 56, at 527.
60.
TFEU, supra note 4, arts. 258-59, at 160-61; see GOEBEL, ET AL., supra note 30, at 9161.
114 (examining Commission enforcement proceedings against member states).
TFEU, supra note 4, art. 267.
62.
Id.; LMG, supra note 9, at 48, 94.
63.
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makes the reference mandatory." More than half of the ECJ's business
consists of ruling on these "preliminary references" from member state
courts. 65

The decision on whether to refer is for the member state court alone, 66
"whether or not the parties to the main proceedings have expressed the
wish that it do so."' The content of the question, however, is not solely for
the member state court to determine. The ECJ may reformulate the
question if, in its judgment, the question is "imprecise or confused." 68 It
may decline to answer questions that, in its judgment, "are not articulated
clearly enough for it to be able to give any meaningful response."' 9 The
Court will not answer hypothetical questions, but it also holds that
"questions concerning European Union law enjoy a presumption of
relevance," such that "the Court may refuse to rule on a question referred
by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of
64.

See Joined Cases 35 & 36/82, Morson & Jhanjan v. Netherlands, 1982 E.C.R. 3723,

3734 ("[T]he third paragraph of [TFEU Article 267] provides that where any such question is raised
before a national court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under
national law that court or tribunal must bring the matter before the court.").
65.
GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 67.
66.
See LMG, supra note 9, at 65 ("From the text of Art. 267 TFEU it follows that only
the national court is entitled to apply to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling."). Although
uncommon, issues may arise as to whether a given member state body qualifies as a court. Id. at
52 ("Generally, the expression 'court or tribunal of a Member State does not raise any
difficulties."). For example, the ECJ distinguishes between investigating magistrates, who may
refer, and prosecutors, who may not. See GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 82-83 (discussing Case

14/86, Pretore di Salo v. Persons Unknown, 1987 E.C.R. 2565, and Joined Cases C-74 & 129/95,
Procura della Republica v. X, 1996 E.C.R. I-6609).
67.

GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 69-70 (quoting Recommendations to National Courts

and Tribunals in Relation to the Initiation of PreliminaryRuling Proceedings,2012 O.J. (C 338)
1, 2).
68.
GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 73 ("From its earliest judgments, the Court [of Justice]
has followed two policies intended to facilitate the effectiveness of the preliminary ruling
procedure: first, granting the referring court or tribunal maximum discretion concerning when to
refer questions,... and secondly, reformulating the questions if they are imprecise or confused.");
see, e.g., Case C-384/08, Attanasio Grp. Srl v. Comune di Carbongnano, 2010 E.C.R. 1-2059, 2066
("[I]f questions have been improperly formulated or go beyond the scope of the powers conferred
on the Court by Article 267 TFEU, the Court is free to extract from all the factors provided by the
national court and, in particular, from the statement of grounds in the order for reference, the
elements of EU law requiring an interpretation having regard to the subject-matter of the dispute."

&

(citing Case 83/78, Pigs Mktg. Bd. v. Redmond, 1978 E.C.R. 2347, 2366)); see also Urska adl

Anna Wallerman, `The Referring Court Asks, in Essence': Is Reformulation of Preliminary
Questions by the Court ofJusticea Decision Writing Fixtureor a Decision-makingApproach?, 25
EuR. L.J. 416 (2019) (discussing several reasons why the ECJ reformulates questions).
69.
GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 73; see, e.g., Case 14/86, Pretore di Sal6 v. Persons

Unknown, 1987 E.C.R. 2565.
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European Union law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the
main action or its purpose." 70 The ECJ does not resolve issues of fact or of
member state law.7 ' It is up to the member state court to decide how to
apply the ECJ's answer.7 2
In some respects, preliminary reference resembles the certification
process in U.S. judicial federalism. Federal courts certify unsettled state
law questions to the state supreme court. The reason federal courts do this
is that any answer they may give will be tentative since only the state
courts possess the authority to resolve state law issues. 73 Nearly every state
has enacted a statute that allows a federal court to send questions of state
law to the state Supreme Court.74 Certification enables federal courts to
obtain authoritative answers to state law questions, but it has not escaped
criticism, and some of these criticisms apply to preliminary reference as
well. Both certification and preliminary reference lead to delays in
adjudicating disputes. 75 Preliminary reference, however, raises a distinct
set of objections because it has greater practical importance for the
development and implementation of EU law than the role of certification
in the state law context. Certification is an occasional practice and a
discretionary one. It is triggered when a federal court happens to encounter
an unsettled state law issue, as it does in certain cases within its diversity
jurisdiction, or in cases challenging a state practice on federal grounds and
the federal issue can be avoided or altered depending on the answer to the
state law issue. It concerns state law issues that are of interest primarily to
the particular state. Most of state law is adjudicated by more conventional
means, in the courts of that state. Preliminary reference is the sole means
Case C-225/09, Jakubowska v. Maneggia, 2010 E.C.R. I-12333, I-12345-46; see
70.
LMG, supra note 9, at 87 (elaborating on the Court of Justice's "well known formula" regarding
this presumption of relevance and the instances where the Court may refuse to rule on questions
referred by national courts).
GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 70 (citing Recommendations to National Courts and
71.
Tribunalsin Relation to the Initiationof PreliminaryRuling Proceedings,2012 O.J. (C 338) 1, 2);
see, e.g., Case 38/77, Enka v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, 1977 E.C.R. 2204, 2213.
See LMG, supra note 9, at 242 ("Naturally, it falls in any event to the national court to
72.
dispose of the case.... [T]he [Court's] judgment ... is always 'preliminary'....").

73.

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

See FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 1116 ("In the decades since Pullman, nearly all
74.
states have adopted procedures that permit federal courts, while retaining jurisdiction of a case, to
certify uncertain state law issues to the state's supreme court for authoritative resolution.").
See id. at 1118 ("Presumably based on his experience on the First Circuit, Judge Selya
75.
complains that certification "frequently adds time and expense to litigation that is already overlong
and overly expensive" without achieving its intended purposes."); GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 30,
at 71 ("Despite its benefits, the preliminary reference mechanism has a major disadvantage, the
delay in awaiting the Court's response .... ").
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by which the ECJ rules on issues of EU law that come up in member state
litigation, even though EU policies apply throughout the Union.
C.

Problems with the PreliminaryReference System

In the early years of the European Economic Community, as it was
then called, the role of preliminary references was unclear. 76 Under
traditional principles of international law, EU law would be derived from
the treaty7 7 and would consist of a set of rules that related solely to relations
between the member states and relations between member states and EU
institutions, 78 not to disputes involving private persons. 79 Morten
Rasmussen notes that "using the preliminary reference system as a
mechanism of European law enforcement at the hands of private litigants
and their advocates . .. had not been part of the treaty design."80 This view
was supported by a literal interpretation of the ECC Treaty, "in
combination with the long established interpretive principle according to
which transfers of sovereignty are to be interpreted narrowly." 8 ' When
treaty obligations are understood in this way, there may be only occasional
need for member state courts to seek preliminary references. No reference
was made from the inception of the organization until 1962.82
Very soon, however, the role of EU law in litigation in member state
courts increased considerably. The leading case is Van Gend en Loos v.

76.
See Morten Rasmussen, Revolutionizing European Law: A History of the Van Gend en
Loos Judgment, 12 INT'L J. CONST. L. 136, 146 n.56 (2014) ("It was by no means clear how the
preliminary reference mechanism would be used. Not even the judges of the EEC seemed to
agree.").
77.
See G. Federico Mancini, The Making ofa Constitutionfor Europe, 26 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 595, 596 (1989) ("[T]he instrument giving rise to the Community was a traditional
multilateral treaty.").
78.
For an early illustration ofthe ECJ's rejection of this line of reasoning, see Joined Cases
90 & 91/63, Comm'n v. Luxembourg & Belgium, 1964 E.C.R. 626; see GOEBEL ET AL., supra note

30,,at 92-93.
79.
The Court rejected this proposition when it adopted the "direct effect" doctrine in Case
26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 2. See also
GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 117.
80.
M. Rasmussen, supra note 76, at 156.
81.
HJALTE RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING

12

(1986).

82.
See M. Rasmussen, supra note 76, at 146-51 (tracing the origins of resort to the
preliminary reference process); Karin van Leeuwen, Pavingthe Road to "LegalRevolution ": The
Dutch Origins of the First PreliminaryReferences in European Law (1957-1963), 24 EUR. L.J.
408, 410 (2018) (noting that "the use of the procedure ... was all but self-evident" and the
"occasion ... allegedly was celebrated with champagne in Luxembourg").
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NederlandseAdministratie der Belastingen83 where the ECJ recognized
the "direct effect" of EU law. 84 The direct effect doctrine holds that EU
treaty obligations may apply not only to relations among governments, but
also to ordinary litigation in the member state courts, involving
government regulation of persons and businesses. 85 As Morten Rasmussen
puts it, "[t]he judgment constituted at the most fundamental level an
attempt to differentiate European law from what was perceived as
traditional international public law." 6 The Court's adoption of the direct
effect doctrine greatly expanded the potential universe of cases in which
member state courts apply EU law.87 That potential was realized in the
ensuing decades. Over time, the number of preliminary references has
exploded, and the preliminary reference is increasingly inadequate to the
task of maintaining ECJ control over the content and application of EU
law.
The key objection to preliminary reference is that it is not aligned
with the EU's current needs. The preliminary reference "was and still is
designed as an international law procedure ... [which] takes place
primarily between institutions and states." 88 Over the course of time, Van
Gend en Loos shifted the focus of litigation over EU law. "The current
disputes ... are increasingly concerned with not just adjudicating disputes
89
between Member States, but more and more within the Member States."
Case 26/62, 1963 E.C.R. 2; see Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a
83.
TransnationalConstitution, 75 AM. J. INT'LL. 1, 3 (1981) (discussing Van Gend en Loos).
84. See H. RASMUSSEN, supra note 81, at 11-12 (discussing the judge-made direct effect
doctrine arising from Van Gen den Loos); T C HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION
LAW 209 (7th ed. 2010) (describing Van Gend en Loos as "one of the most important judgments
ever handed down by the Court").
See LENAERTS & VAN NUFFEL, supra note 56, at 809 ("Ever since the 1963 judgment
85.
in Van Gend & Loos, it is clear that individuals may derive rights directly from Union . .. law.");
J. H. H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2413 (1991) (noting how
Community law "operates not only in creating enforceable legal obligations between the member
states and individuals, but also among individuals inter se").
M. Rasmussen, supra note 76, at 155.
86.
See Lecuwen, supra note 82, at 408-09 (explaining how Van Gend en Loos "was used
87.
by the ECJ to transform the preliminary reference mechanism into a route for private litigants to
challenge national policies via EEC law"); Weiler, supra note 85, at 2414 ("In practice direct effect
meant that member states violating their Community obligations could not shift the locus of dispute
to the interstate or Community plane. They would be faced with legal actions before their own
courts at the suit of individuals within their own legal order.").
Michal Bobek, The Court of Justice, the National Courts, and the Spirit of
88.
Cooperation:Between Dichtung and Warheit, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU INSTITUTIONAL
LAW 353, 358 (A. Lazowski & S. Blockmans eds., 2016) [hereinafter Spirit of Cooperation].

89.

Id.
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Contrary to Osborn's norm, preliminary reference does not furnish
the EU with "the means of expounding, as well as enforcing, [its] own
laws."" To a large extent, the EU suffers from that very deficiency. This
is so for multiple reasons. First, answering questions may serve the
"expounding" role, but does nothing on the enforcement side. Second,
absent EU authority to find facts, to review fact finding, or at least to
review the application of law to fact, EU norms can easily be discounted
by recalcitrant member state courts. Third, member state courts, not
litigants, control the reference process and may simply decline to refer.
Fourth, if member state courts do not refer, the ECJ lacks means to enforce
sanctions against them. Fifth, the precedential force of preliminary rulings
in later litigation may be limited and cannot be enforced.
1.

Answering Questions vs. Adjudicating Disputes

Preliminary reference separates litigation over EU law into two parts.
The member state court adjudicates most of the dispute and the ECJ
answers questions of EU law. It is unclear whether the ECJ can effectively
expound and enforce EU law, or inspire allegiance to EU judicial
institutions, by answering questions rather than by directly adjudicating at
trial or on appeal. Thus, "[t]he type of cooperation instituted by the
preliminary rulings procedure has as its consequence a certain dissociation
between the individual case and the decision of the Court." Part of the
problem is that the questions are formulated by the member state judge,
not the parties. 92 But the judge-whose training and experience are mainly
in the law of the member state-may not be as well-versed in EU law as
the parties and the questions may not be well-framed.93 When the dispute
moves to the ECJ, the parties have only a secondary role in the ensuing
ECJ proceedings. Though "[t]he parties to the original case are naturally
entitled to submit observations ... it is the Member States and the EU
institutions that are the chief players."'

90.

Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 818-19 (1824).

91.
Spirit of Cooperation, supra note 88, at 361.
92.
See LMG, supra note 9, at 69 ("Certainly, the parties to the main proceedings are at
liberty to make proposals, but it is the Judge alone who determines whether he or she accepts them
wholly or in part or completely deviates from them.").
93.
See id. at 69-70 (describing how the Court of Justice may reformulate questions
referred by national courts).
94.
Michal Bobek, Landtovd, Holubec, and the Problem of an Uncooperative Court:
Implicationsfor the PreliminaryReference Procedure, 10 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 54, 78 (2014).
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Certain features of U.S. public law litigation suggest that this
approach may not work as well as a party-centered method for resolving
disputes. For example, the law on "standing to sue" in the U.S. federal
courts emphasizes the value of the adversarial presentation of issues. The
rationale is that litigants, who have a "personal stake in the outcome," may
95
be better suited to argue effectively for their respective positions. The
U.S. Supreme Court requires this "personal stake" because it "enables a
complainant authoritatively to present to a court a complete perspective
upon the adverse consequences flowing from the specific set of facts
undergirding his grievance."" Preliminary reference attenuates the link
between the litigants and the dispute.
Since the "chief players" in the preliminary reference process are not
the litigants, but rather the member states and EU institutions, the views
of these institutional participants may receive more weight than they
deserve. Because the EU issue has been severed from the rest of the
litigation, the ECJ may pay too little attention to the underlying dispute.
Neither the institutions nor the ECJ may fully grasp the practical
significance of its ruling. The member state judge "may wonder whether
the Court has . .. genuinely thought through the consequences, impact and
the potential life of its case law in [member state] courts."' The problem
is not just that the ECJ ruling may be "difficult to follow." 98 Over time,
"[i]f the norm-setting authority keeps enacting rules which are, for
whatever reason, not able to regulate social reality to any reasonable
degree, it becomes irrelevant and consequently may be perceived as
illegitimate." 99
Besides the impact on particular EU policies, severing the issue of
EU law from the underlying litigation interferes with the broader goal of
further European integration.100 The "question-answering" approach
signals to litigants and others that the ECJ's role is only "to provide general
guidance on matters of EU law."'" Even if the member state court decides
that the ECJ's answer is decisive for the particular case, the ultimate
decision will have been made by the member state court. In this way, the
preliminary reference process assures that both the credit and the blame
95.

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).

96.
97.

Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 (1974).
Spirit of Cooperation,supra note 88, at 373.

98.
99.

Id.

100.
union").
101.

Id. at 375.
See TEU, supra note 26, art.

1 (noting

the EU's objective to create "an ever closer

Spirit of Cooperation,supra note 88, at 361.
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for ultimate decisions belongs to the member state court that adjudicates
the claim. That court, and not the ECJ, will be viewed as the institution
that is primarily responsible for administering the law, with the ECJ
merely providing answers (of varying utility) to specific questions.
2.

Fact Finding and the Application of Law to Fact

Effective enforcement of a legal norm hinges on findings of fact and
the application of law to fact. Sometimes fact finding and application of
law to fact are uncontroversial. Not always, though. Especially in close
cases that call for discretionary judgments, the enforcement of a legal
norm depends on the talent and sympathy of the judges who find the facts
and apply the norm to the facts. Hostile, indifferent, mediocre, or
inexperienced judges may formally respect the norm, but subvert the
policy behind it, either deliberately or unintentionally, by distorted fact
findings or applications of law to fact. A recurrent theme in U.S. judicial
federalism is that federal courts will typically apply federal law more
effectively than state courts. 02 Acting on this premise, the U.S. Congress
and the Supreme Court have often granted original jurisdiction over
federal law to the network of lower federal courts, especially when federal
policy conflicted with that of the states. That option is not available in the
European Union since there is no network of lower courts.
The preliminary reference assigns the important tasks of fact finding
and application of law to fact exclusively to the member state courts.' 03 A
rough U.S. analogue is the enforcement of federal law by the state courts.
But the analogy serves only to highlight a weakness of the EU's approach,
at least from the perspective of achieving greater integration. The critical
difference between the U.S. and EU systems is that, in the United States,
the Supreme Court is not limited to ruling on abstract matters of federal
law. The Court may review the record to assure that the evidence supports
the state court's conclusions and overturn findings of fact that are not
sufficiently supported by the record.'0 4 Having remanded a case to state
102. See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1977)
(criticizing the assumption "that federal and state trial courts are equally competent forums for the
enforcement of federal constitutional rights").
103. See LMG, supra note 9, at 233-34, 242 (discussing the national court's jurisdiction in
the context of preliminary references and how the ECJ does not rule on facts or points of national

law).
104. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-85 (1964) ("[W]e deem
that considerations of effective judicial administration require us to review the evidence in the
present record to determine whether it could constitutionally support a judgment for respondent.
This Court's duty is not limited to the elaboration of constitutional principles; we must also in
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court, the Court may later review the state court's application of federal
law. Even if the state court rests its holding on a state law ground, the U.S.
Supreme Court may review the judgment to determine whether the state
ground is adequate to support the judgment."0 5
Osborn recognized the value of federal court fact-finding in
implementing federal policy.1 06 U.S. Supreme Court appellate review of
state judgments rests on the principle that enforcement of federal law
07
requires oversight of the judges who find facts and apply law to fact.'
The Supreme Court may reverse the judgment, give directions for further
proceedings, and impose sanctions on state court judges if they defy its
mandates.1 08 In the European Union, however, the preliminary reference
process begins and ends the ECJ's involvement in the case. Having
answered the question presented to it, the ECJ has no authority to oversee
the implementation of its ruling.'0 9
3.

Failure to Refer

If the decision whether to make a preliminary reference were for the
parties, one could count on references of any issues that might provide a
party ammunition for his or her side of the case. But the decision to refer
is exclusively for the member state court." 0 Under TFEU Article 267,
reference is optional for most member state courts other than courts of last
resort. A busy member state court, whose "chief interest ... is to do its
own job properly: to deliver a decent decision within reasonable time and,

proper cases review the evidence to make certain that those principles have been constitutionally
applied."); see also Henry P. Monaghan, ConstitutionalFactReview, 85 COtuM. L. REv. 229,23238 (1985) (discussing the "vexing" distinction between questions of law and those of fact).
105. See Henry P. Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of
State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1919, 1919 (2003) (advocating "the
Supreme Court has ancillary jurisdiction to review state-court determinations of state law in
[certain] cases" and rejecting criticism thereof).
106. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of a strong
federal judiciary as espoused by Osborn).
107. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 344 (1816) ("The courts of the
United States can, without question, revise the proceedings of the executive and legislative
authorities of the states, and if they are found to be contrary to the constitution, may declare them
to be of no legal validity. ... [T]he exercise of the same right over judicial tribunals is not a higher
or more dangerous act of sovereign power.").
108. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 476-77 (discussing the Supreme Court's authority
in light of a state court judgment contrary to federal law).
109. See BROBERG & FENGER, supra note 15.
110. See LMG, supra note 9, at 52 ("[T]he initiative of referring the question must emanate
from 'a court or tribunal ... of a Member State .... ").
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if possible, with minimal effort" may not invest the time and energy
needed to refer many questions."' At the lower court level, then, issues of
EU law will routinely be adjudicated with no opportunity for ECJ or other
EU court review. Member state control over references is an important
reason why the ECJ lacks control over the content and application of EU
law.
Article 267 makes preliminary reference mandatory when the EU
issue arises in litigation before a member state court from which there is
no recourse within the member state judicial system. 1 2 This means that
the member state constitutional courts, including the GFCC, do not have
a choice.1' But an exception to this rule permits member state courts to
avoid preliminary reference without flatly ignoring Article 267. Under the
acte clair doctrine, announced in SRL CILFIT v. Ministry of Health, "the
correct application of [Union] law may be so obvious as to leave no scope
for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question raised is
to be resolved.""4 According to the ECJ in CILFIT, its own prior rulings
"may deprive the [referral] obligation of its purpose [i.e., resolving an EU
issue] and thus empty it of its substance.""5 Under CILFIT, if the member
state court determines that EU law is clear, it is relieved of its duty to refer
the issue. CILFIT's acte clair doctrine gives the member state courts
considerable room to maneuver without necessarily violating Article 267
because CILFIT may apply "even though the questions at issue are not
strictly identical."" 6 Furthermore, acte clair does not depend on whether
the ECJ has ruled on an issue, so long as "the correct application of
Community law [is] so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable
doubt."' '? Thus, the application of this exception to Article 267 depends
on the extent to which member state courts decide that their preferred
reading of EU law is sufficiently obvious. One need not disparage the good

111. Spirit of Cooperation, supra note 88, at 371.
112. See TFEU, supra note 4 ("Where any such question is raised in a case pending before
a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under
national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court.").
113. See LMG, supra note 9, at 94 ("[T]he highest [national courts] ... are under a general
duty to make a preliminary reference .... ").
114. LMG, supra note 9, at 99 (quoting Case 283/81, Srl CILFIT v. Ministry of Health,
1982 E.C.R. 3417, 3430); see also GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 79 (explaining the acte clair
doctrine "essentially means that when a court or tribunal is convinced that it knows how to properly
interpret and apply the Treaty or other rules of Community, it may properly do so").

115. Case 283/81, Srl CILFIT v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415, 3429.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 3430.
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faith of member state judges in order to doubt whether this principle will
always be applied in a rigorous fashion." 8
The ECJ can determine the content and application of EU law only
when member state courts refer questions to it. Michal Bobek
demonstrates that strict application of the CILFIT criteria would result in
many more references than at present. In his view, "the number of requests
for preliminary rulings . . would not stand roughly in the realm of several
hundred as at preset, but there would be several more zeros at the end of
that figure," while in practice, "the CILFIT requirements today are
11 9
considerably diverging from reality in the member states." Emboldened
by the acte clair doctrine, some member state judiciaries make far fewer
references per capita than others. Many EU member states include in their
judiciaries a "constitutional court," with jurisdiction over issues of
fundamental law. As of 2015, "[o]ut of 18 Constitutional Courts in the EU,
2 0 The French
only 9 [had] resorted to preliminary reference."
Constitutional Council had made just one reference in the sixty-year
history of the European Union.12 ' The failure to refer is not limited to
constitutional courts. One study found that between 1998 and 2008, the
per capita rate of referrals was ten times as great from Austria as from
22
France and almost six times as great from Belgium as from Spain. A
recent update of the data finds similar differences in the period from 2009
to 2019.'23 Michal Bobek estimates that, in a given year, EU law applies
in "several millions of cases in all the courts of member states and tens of
24
Yet the number of
thousands of decisions in courts of last instance."
118. See, e.g., Alexander Kornezov, The New Format of the Acte Clair Doctrine and Its
Consequences, 53 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1317, 1317-18 (2016) (asserting that this doctrine "was
seen by some as a convenient general waiver which freed national courts of last instance from the
obligation to make references to Luxembourg in the majority of cases").

119. Michal Bobek, Institutional Report, in NATIONAL COURTS AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF
EU LAW: THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF NATIONAL COURTS IN THE EU LEGAL ORDER, supra note 19, at 89.
120. Maria Dicosola, Cristina Fasone & Irene Spigno, Foreword: Constitutional Courts in
the European Legal System After the Treaty of Lisbon and the Euro-Crisis, 16 GERMAN L. REV.

1317, 1318 (2015).
121. See Frangois-Xavier Millet, How Much Lenience for How Much Cooperation? On the
First Preliminary Reference of the French Constitutional Council to the Court of Justice, 51
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 195, 195-96 (2014) ("[T]he first preliminary reference of the Constitutional
Council to the ECJ, which occurred on April 4, 2013 in the Jeremy F. case, came as a surprise.")
(footnote omitted).
122. BROBERG & FENGER, supra note 15, at 38 tbl.2.2a.
123. Memorandum from Anna Marie Whitacre, Rsch. Assistant, U. Ga. Sch. L. (July 9,
2020) (on file with author).

124. Michal Bobek, Of Feasibilityand Silent Elephants: The Legitimacy of the Court of
Justice through the Eyes of National Courts, in JUDGING EUROPE'S JUDGES: THE LEGITIMACY OF
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referrals is well under a thousand.' 25 The result is a large body of member
state case law that includes unreviewable rulings on EU law, or that wholly
ignores relevant EU law. The absence of both lower EU courts and ECJ
appellate review means that, as a practical matter, the member state courts
are largely unaccountable for these rulings. Current preliminary reference
practice does not enable the EU judiciary to maintain control over the
content and application of EU law.' 2 6
4.

Weak Sanctions

Among its other virtues, appellate review provides a means by which
a superior court in a judicial hierarchy may impose a sanction for a lower
court's violation of a rule. The sanction may be as subtle as a reversal, or
perhaps a summary reversal without briefing or argument. A less subtle
repudiation might include some unusually critical language. But the
certainty of reversal is probably enough to deter most lower court judges
from crossing clear lines between permissible and forbidden acts. The
preliminary reference procedure does not hand the ECJ a similar tool for
enforcing its rules on member state courts who break them by failing to
refer or by ignoring ECJ rulings after a reference. The May 5, 2020 Weiss
ruling by the GFCC illustrates this point.'12 The GFCC rejected the ECJ's
earlier ruling on the same issue in a preliminary reference.1 2 8 The ECJ may
ignore the GFCC ruling, or even issue a statement in opposition, 129 but has
no jurisdiction to directly repudiate it.

THE CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE EXAMINED

197,211

(Maurice Adams,

Johan

Meeusen, Gert Straetmans & Henri de Waele eds., 2013).
125. See InstitutionalReport, supra note 119, at 87 (reporting a preliminary figure of 641

for 2019).
126. Michal Bobek is now an Advocate General at the Court of Justice. In that capacity, he
recently proposed a reform of the CILFIT procedure, recommending that the rules be changed "to
a more objective imperative of securing uniform interpretation of EU law across the European
Union. In other words, the duty to refer a question for a preliminary ruling should not be focused
primarily on the correct answers, but rather on identifying the right questions." Case C-561/19,

Opinion of Advocate General Bobek, ECLI:EU:C:2021:291, ¶4 (Apr. 15, 2021).
127. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (discussing Weiss case and GFCC's

holding).
128. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (explaining how GFCC's Weiss holding
conflicts with the ECJ's).
129. See Sam Fleming & Martin Arnold, EU's Top Court Reasserts PrimacyAfter German
Challenge,FIN. TIMEs (May 8, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/894369cd-9631-43cc-8844-d6c
d515e874b (reporting ECJ's statement that "the EU's legal order would be jeopardised if national
courts diverged from its rulings on whether EU institutions' actions were compliant with the law").
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In both the failure-to-refer context and the Weiss fact pattern, the
absence of appellate review makes it impossible for the ECJ to enforce the
referral obligation on its own initiative.'13 The available sanctions are not
aimed at the member state court but at the member state itself. For
example, the Treaty authorizes the European Commission to sue a
3
member state for "infringement" of its obligations under EU law.' ' The
ECJ treats failure of a court of last resort to refer and failure to follow an
ECJ preliminary ruling as infringement.3 In response to Weiss, the
European Commission may sue Germany in the ECJ.1 33 But this remedy
does not directly address the German Court's ruling. Actions taken against
Germany may have no impact on the German Court. Under the German
conception of separation of powers, the German executive and legislature
may lack authority to take such an action as well.'34 In addition, the
Commission may not choose to act, for reasons unrelated to the German
Court's holding. The Commission's litigation agenda may not give a high
priority to this type of litigation, especially against Germany, the most
powerful member state.1 35 Moreover, Weiss is not typical, as the GFCC's
defiance in that case was self-evident. In many cases it is far harder to
show that the member state court has failed to follow EU rules. Perhaps
130. See Pavone & Kelemen, supra note 22, at 352-53 ("[T]he European Union lacks the
coercive and bureaucratic capacity that national states use to govern from the top down. EU
institutions must therefore project their authority by forging subnational 'compliance
constituencies' comprised of on-the ground networks of regulators, NGOs, civic organizations, and
lawyers.").
131. TFEU, supra note 4, art. 258-60; see LMG, supra note 9, at 159 (explaining actions for
infringement of Union law by a member state "ensure the enforcement of Union law as part of the
system ofjudicial protection enshrined in the Treaties").
132. See LMG, supra note 9, at 205-14, 244 (discussing the consequences of a judgment
declaring a member state failed to fulfil its Treaty obligations including sanctions for member state
non-compliance); Araceli Turmo, A Dialogue of Unequals-The European Court of Justice
ReassertsNational Courts' ObligationsunderArticle 267(3) TFEU, 15 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 340,
341 (2019) (discussing CILFIT along with "the broader issues at stake and the need for the [ECJ]
to reassert its authority as the supreme court of the EU legal order as well as the obligations of
national courts of last instance").
133. For other instances of the Commission filing suit with the ECJ against a member state
for Union law infringement, see, e.g., Case C-154/08, Commission v. Spain, 2009 E.C.R. I-187;
Case C-129/00, Commission v. Italy, 2003 E.C.R. 1-1467.

134. See
153-62 (1994).

DAVID

P.

CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

135. The Commission may be influenced by factors besides the merits in determining
whether to take action against a member state. See Arthur Dyevre & Timothy Yu-Cheong Yeung,
Disciplining Member States: Does Public Mood Influence the European Commission?,
SSRN (May 22, 2020), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfi?abstractid=3607804 (investigating
the effect of public opinion on the European Union centralized compliance monitoring system).
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the acte clair doctrine provides arguable grounds for failure to refer. Or
perhaps, in response to the ECJ's ruling on a preliminary reference, the
member state court sidesteps the ECJ ruling by finding member state law
that will support its judgment.
Besides an infringement case brought by the Commission, another
option is a suit for damages, brought against the member state by a litigant
who loses a case in the member state system, but might have won if the
member state court had referred an EU issue to the ECJ.' 36 This, too, is an
unsatisfactory option. Disappointed litigants must clear several hurdles in
order to win. They must sue the member state in the member state's court;
they must show a high level of culpability on the part of the member state
in connection with the failure to refer; and they must prove a causal
connection between the failure to refer and his ultimate defeat in the prior
litigation.' 37 Few litigants succeed in these suits for damages against
member states, whether they are based on "failure to refer" or other
violations of EU law.' 38 In addition, the relief will have no direct effect on
the offender, namely, the court that ignored its referral obligation.
5.

Uncertain Precedents

The ECJ asserts that a ruling in response to a preliminary reference
is not limited to the case for which the reference was made. It asserts that,
like the case law of a common law court, its "rulings constitute binding
precedents."' 39 Under this doctrine, courts across the European Union are

136. See, e.g., Case C-224/01, K6bler v. Republik Osterreich, 2003 E.C.R. I-10209; see also
LMG, supra note 9, at 103, 142 ("Union law requires Member States to recognize the possibility
of a claim in damages against the public authorities where an infringement by a court of last resort
of its obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling demonstrably thwarts a right conferred
on individuals by Union law."); Zs6fia Varga, National Remedies in the Case of Violation of EU
Law by Member State Courts, 54 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 51 (2017) (discussing remedies available
in the various member state courts).
137. See Wells, supra note 25, at 743-46 (discussing remedies for failure to refer or failure
to implement the CJEU's ruling).
138. See Tobias Lock, Is PrivateEnforcement ofEU Law Through State Liability a Myth?
An Assessment 20 Years After Frankovich, 49 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1675, 1700 (2012) ("Both
the statistical findings and the analysis of national court decisions ... suggest that Member State
liability is not a successful means of enforcing European Union law."); see also Spirit of
Cooperation, supra note 88, at 361-62 (noting that plaintiffs in prominent cases establishing the
duty to compensate ultimately lost their cases).
139. GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 72; see also LMG, supra note 9, at 244. For a
discussion of the ECJ's doctrine of precedent, see Mattias Derl6n & Johan Lindholm,
CharacteristicsofPrecedent:The Case Law ofthe EuropeanCourt ofJustice in Three Dimensions,
16 GERMAN L.J. 1073 (2015). The authors conducted an empirical study and found that "the
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obliged to follow its holding. In this sense, the relationship between the
ECJ and the member state courts is hierarchical with the ECJ at the top. In
a more important sense, however, the supposed hierarchy may be an
illusion. With no appellate review available, the preliminary reference
procedure relies upon "the spirit of cooperation."" Michal Bobek asks:
"Do national courts generally follow the case law of the Court of
Justice?""4 His "frank answer is that no one knows, at least at the overall
European level." 4 2 Some academic studies assert that member state courts
do comply, but those studies are unpersuasive, according to Bobek. They
focus on the adoption of especially prominent ECJ cases by a small
number of national courts. We have no answer to the more general
question because "[a]s of today, there are no large-scale empirical studies
which could shed any reliable light on what is the reality in application of
EU law in national courts." 4 3
The real-world administration of the preliminary reference process
heightens the likelihood that many preliminary rulings will have no
application beyond the case that gave rise to the reference. Under TFEU
Article 267, the ECJ's jurisdiction over preliminary references is
mandatory. This means that the ECJ decides every preliminary reference,
unless the reference is defective in some way.4 4 In order to manage its
workload the ECJ divides the references according to their importance." 5
Comparatively minor questions go to a panel of three Justices; more
important ones receive a hearing before five Justices; and only the most
important cases get a "Grand Chamber" of fifteen. 4 6 On rare occasions
the entire group of twenty-seven will hear a case.44 The smaller panels

greatest precedential and persuasive power of case law can be found among cases brought as
preliminary rulings." Id. at 1087.
140. See Spirit of Cooperation, supra note 88, at 354.

141. Id. at 365.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 365-66.
144. A reference may be rejected if it comes from an official or body other than a "court or
tribunal," within the meaning of TFEU Article 267. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-74 & 129-95, Procura
della Repubblica v. X, 1996 E.C.R. I-6629 (Italian prosecutor is not empowered to make
references); see also LMG, supra note 9, at 52. A reference may also be rejected if the issue raised
is not sufficiently relevant to the proceeding in the member state court. See id. at 82; GOEBEL ET
AL., supra note 30, at 84-85.
145. See GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 56.
146. See LMG, supra note 9, at 19-20.

147. See id. at 19 n.46.
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often respond to the question with a "reasoned order," which briefly cites
earlier cases or other legal materials.' 4 8
III.

EXPANDING THE EU JUDICIARY

Two features of U.S. judicial federalism assure compliance with
Osborn's maxim that "governments which are not extremely defective in
their organization must possess, within themselves, the means of
expounding, as well as enforcing, their own laws."14 9 One is the network
of lower federal courts in the United States. The other is U.S. Supreme
Court review of state court judgments. 50 Both are missing from the EU's
judicial system. Each of these features of U.S. federal-state relations
suggests a possible reform of EU judicial institutions. This part of the
Article examines the pros and cons of establishing a network of lower EU
courts. Part IV discusses ECJ appellate review of member state rulings that
depend on EU law.
Adherence to the U.S. model favors adoption of both of these
reforms. Indeed, the second is necessary even if the first is adopted
because EU issues would continue to be litigated in member state courts,
just as federal issues are routinely adjudicated in state courts in the United
5 In addition, a group
States."'
of lower federal courts would produce as
much disuniformity as in the United States. Whether the lower court is
state or federal, appellate review helps to achieve uniform national law.I 2
The two reforms may be complementary, yet they require separate
treatment because the network alternative alters the current federal-state
balance in the European Union to a greater extent than appellate review.
Since its federalism costs are greater, its benefits are harder to justify.
Both reforms shift the EU's version of federalism away from the
current Member-State-centered version and closer to the U.S. approach to
judicial federalism. As in the United States, channeling more EU judicial
business to the EU courts weakens the authority of the member state
judiciaries in one way or another, either by depriving them of jurisdiction

148. See Arthur Dyevre, Monika Glavina & Michael Ovadek, Case Selection in the
PreliminaryRuling Procedure,AUSTRIANJ. PUB. L. (Dec. 9, 2019), https://ssm.com/abstract=3489
741.

149.
150.
151.
defenses to
152.

Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819-20 (1824).

See LaCroix, supra note 40, at 206.
For example, in the United States, state courts adjudicate federal issues that arise as
state law claims.
See Gil Seinfeld, The FederalCourts as a Franchise:Rethinking the Justificationsfor
FederalQuestion Jurisdiction,97 CALIF. L. REv. 95, 115 n.60 (2009).
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or by ECJ oversight.' It follows that both reforms depend on the
willingness to diminish, in one way or another, the current role of member
state courts for the sake of greater integration among the member states.'
But ECJ review seems the better choice, at least for the time being,
because it is less intrusive and recognize a role for member state courts in
the development of EU law. As the process of integration proceeds, and
the need for EU courts to adjudicate EU law becomes more pressing, the
"network" alternative may become more palatable.
A.

A Network ofLower EU Courts: JudicialFederalismin U.S.
History

At first glance, the notion of setting up a network of lower EU courts
to adjudicate EU issues seems to be the better choice because it comes
closer to the goal of control of EU law in an EU judiciary, as required by
the Osborn norm.'" A court with original jurisdiction, or in European
vocabulary, a court of "first instance,"15 6 hears the witnesses, examines the
evidence, decides the facts, and applies the law to the facts. This system is
arguably superior not only to preliminary reference but also to appellate
review.' 57
One problem with appellate review is the size of the system. In a
large polity with many member state courts, like the European Union or
the United States, appellate review cannot hope to provide full oversight
of their rulings on federal law.1 58 Even if the appellate court could review
every case, that court has no firsthand knowledge of the case and can only
153. C: LaCroix, supra note 40, at 210 ("Marshall's and [Justice Joseph] Story's
commitment to building the power of the inferior federal courts ... stemmed from their deeply
held belief that the 'judicial power of the United States' described in Article III of the Constitution
represented the chief bulwark against the wayward, localist tendencies of the states.").
154. TEU, supra note 26, art. 1.
155. Chief Justice John Marshall and Justice Joseph Story--the strongest advocates of
federal judicial power in the early 19th century U.S.-would surely agree. See LaCroix, supra note
40, at 206 ("Marshall and Story were deeply committed to the belief that the inferior federal courts
were and ought to be the principal physical embodiment of the national government, reaching into
the otherwise highly localized space of the cities, towns, and countryside of the United States.");
see also id. at 236-37 (discussing Marshall and Story's preference for original over solely appellate
jurisdiction).
156.

See, e.g., JOHN BELL, SOPHIE BOYRON & SIMON WHITTAKER, PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH

LAW 43-46 (2d ed. 2008) (describing the French criminal and civil systems of first instance).
157. See John F. Preis, Reassessing the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 42
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 247, 292 (2007) (arguing that absent a network of lower federal courts,
"state courts would essentially control the meaning of federal law").
158. See Bobek, supra note 124, at 216 & n.66.
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review the record of the proceedings. To a significant extent, the appellate
court must defer to decisions made by the trial judge. Indeed, Osborn
stressed this distinction between trial and appeal. Chief Justice Marshall
said that a litigant with a federal claim should not "be restricted to the
insecure remedy of an appeal upon an insulated point, after [the case] has
received that shape which may be given to it by another tribunal."159
The history of judicial federalism in the United States furnishes some
evidence of the role of federal courts in enforcing federal law. That history
reflects persistent efforts, over a long period of time, and in a range of
substantive contexts, to implement Osborn's principles.' 60 From the
beginning of the Republic, "[e]xpanding federal judicial power to the
inferior federal courts ... [has] long been a crucial element of the
Federalists' project of ensuring national supremacy. ."161 Throughout
U.S. history, federal judicial power has grown in tandem with federal
legislative and executive power. The process was always resisted by
advocates of state authority, the so-called "anti-federalists" of the 1780s
and their descendants. Though Osborn, decided in 1824, set the stage for
development of a strong federal judiciary, 6 2 many decades passed before
Congress and the Supreme Court substantially implemented Osborn's
principles.
1.

Federal Courts in the Pre-Civil War Era

Before the 1861-65 Civil War, federal courts were mainly concerned
with diversity jurisdiction, in which the litigants were citizens of different
states and the issues involved state law. The corpus of federal law was
small and there was no general federal question jurisdiction during
virtually this entire period.1 63 Many federal constitutional provisions did
not apply to the states at all."" Even in this period, however, several
episodes illustrate the special role of federal courts in enforcing federal
law:
In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress granted the lower
federal courts jurisdiction over suits brought by the United
159. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822-23 (1824).
160. See FALLON ET AL., supranote 12, at 779; see also PETER HOFFER ET AL., THE FEDERAL
COURTS: AN ESSENTIAL HISTORY (2016).
161. LaCroix, supra note 40, at 207.
162. See id. at 226-35 (discussing Osborn and its background).
163. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 779-81.

164. See Barron v. Mayor of Bait., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that the Bill of
Rights only applies to the national government).
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States,'6 5 federal criminal cases, 16 6 admiralty cases,1 67 "suits
against consuls and vice-consuls,"'6 8 and petitions for writs of
habeas corpus.1 69 The jurisdiction over federal crimes and
admiralty was "exclusive," meaning that the state courts could not
adjudicate those cases.
In 1801, an outgoing federalist majority in Congress
enacted general federal question jurisdiction, though the statute
was quickly repealed by the new majority in 1802.170
More targeted efforts to use federal courts to protect
federal policies were more enduring. For example, a nineteenth
century statute permitted certain federal officers to remove cases
brought against them from state to federal court, at least if the
officer asserted a federal defense.' 7
Osborn and a companion case, Bank of the UnitedStates v. Planter'sBank
of Georgia,'7 2 illustrate a related theme. Early in U.S. history, Congress
established the First Bank of the United States in order to facilitate
government borrowing, tax collection, and the "augmentation of the active
or productive capital."' 73 This was a controversial exercise of federal
power because the Bank displaced state control of the financial system and
4
no constitutional provision explicitly authorized a national bank.' In
Osborn, for example, Ohio officials had entered a branch of the Bank by
force and had taken $100,000 that, according to the state, the Bank owed
in taxes. In the companion case, Planter's Bank had declined to pay the
165.

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,

§

11, 1 Stat. 73.

166. Id. §§ 9, 11.
167. Id. §9.
168. Id. The statute also gives lower federal courts jurisdiction over "diversity" cases, which
mainly consist of suits between citizens of different states, in which the issues are governed by state

law. See id. § 11.
169. Id. § 14.
170. FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 780-81; see LaCroix, supra note 40, at 207-08
(discussing this episode).
171. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (derived from Act March 3, 1875, c. 130, § 8, 18 Stat. 401; Feb. 8,
1894, c. 25, § 1, 28 Stat. 36); see Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1880) (upholding the federalofficer removal statute); see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 27-28 (discussing other pre-Civil
War episodes, "a series of collisions between federal and state authority [which] provoked
Congress to extend federal jurisdiction to meet threats to federal interests").

172. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
173. FELDMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 28, at 89.
174. The Court upheld the creation of the bank as an exercise of Congress's Article I power
to take steps "necessary and proper" to achieve its other Article I powers. See McCulloch v.

Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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Bank of the United States money owed under promissory notes Planter's
Bank had issued. These episodes help to explain the Court's broad holding,
that Congress may grant federal jurisdiction whenever a case contains a
federal "ingredient," whether or not the federal ingredient is at issue in the
litigation. That holding is often understood as a means of protecting the
bank from hostile state courts by guaranteeing that federal lower court
jurisdiction would be available for virtually any litigation involving the
bank. 17 5 As Justice Johnson acknowledged in his dissent in Osborn, "a
state of things [had] now grown up, in some of the States, which renders
all the protection necessary, that the general government can give to this
Bank."' 76
2.

The Civil War, the Union Victory, and its Aftermath

More than four decades after Osborn, victory over the secessionist
Confederacy boosted the strength of the national government and
transformed American federalism.1 7 7 This spurred a radical shift in the role
of the federal courts. Nationalist legislators, now in control of Congress,
altered both the substantive law of federal-state relations and the balance
between the roles of federal and state courts. 178 The Thirteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, enacted in 1865, abolished slavery.1 79 The
Fourteenth, enacted in 1868, imposed new substantive constitutional
limits on state authority, obliging them to accord all persons "equal
protection of the laws," and forbidding them from depriving persons of
life, liberty, or property without "due process of law."1 80 Two years later,
the Fifteenth stopped states from denying the right to vote on account of
race.'81 Congress expanded federal power by enacting "a compendious

175.

See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 471 (1957) (Frankfurter,

J., dissenting); see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 800, 801-02.
176. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 871-72 (1824) (Johnson,
J., dissenting).
177. See Henry J. Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 88 YALE L.J. 1019, 1021 (1977) ("The
watershed was the war between the states, the adoption of the three Reconstruction amendments,
especially the Fourteenth, and enactment of the various civil rights acts with jurisdiction in the
federal courts to enforce them.") (footnote omitted).
178. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT:
A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 57 (1928) ("The supremacy of national authority, the
extension of federal activities, the resort to federal agencies, were vindicated both in theory and
practice to the mind of the dominant North.").
179. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.

180. Id. amend. XIV,
181. Id. amend. XV.

§ 1.
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8 2 In
series of statutes extending the jurisdiction of the federal courts."
1867, it expanded state prisoners' access to federal habeas corpus review
of their convictions,83 and in 1871 it authorized federal suits against state
officers for constitutional violations.' 8 4
In 1875, Congress went a step further. It replaced the old piecemeal
approach to federal jurisdiction with general "federal question"
85
jurisdiction over cases "arising under" federal law.' The federal courts
"ceased to be restricted tribunals of fair dealing between citizens of
different states and became the primary and powerful reliances for
vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws, and treaties of
the United States."' 86 When uniformity, expertise, and hospitality to
federal claims are especially important, Congress has made federal
jurisdiction exclusive of the state courts. 8 7 Although sensitive issues of
federalism arise when federal law collides with state policy, the post-Civil
War Supreme Court guaranteed federal court enforcement of the
89
Fourteenth Amendment.' 88 The landmark case is Exparte Young,' which
held that federal law challenges to state action can be brought against state
officers in federal court, despite the general rule that states may assert
sovereign immunity from suit.' 90 The Young doctrine in effect carves out
9
an exception to that immunity for forward-looking remedies,' ' and is
widely considered to be "indispensable to the establishment of
constitutional government and the rule of law."'9 2 Another period of rapid
growth occurred in the 1960s, with the Supreme Court's case law
expanding the scope of constitutional rights and the jurisdictional tools

182. FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 28
183. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
184. Act of April 20, 1871, §§ 1-2, 6, 17 Stat. 13-15. The statute has been amended several
times since then and is currently codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Among other provisions aimed at
quelling Ku Klux Klan terrorism, section 1 of this statute authorized a damages remedy for
violations of constitutional rights "under color of' state law. That provision statute remained largely
dormant for ninety years, until the Court ruled that it applied to unconstitutional conduct even if
state law provided a remedy. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).

§ 1331 (originally enacted as Act of March 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470).

185.
186.
187.
188.

28 U.S.C.

189.
190.

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).

FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 178, at 65.

See Gulf Offshore, Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 483-84 (1981).
See FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 927 n.1.

191. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
192. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE,
2011).
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needed to enforce them in federal court. 93 All of these developments
enhanced the role of the federal courts, as Marshall and Story had
envisioned. Writing on the occasion of the bicentennial of the federal
judiciary, Daniel Meltzer concluded that, "[i]nsofar as modern lawyers
have a common intellectual heritage, the federal courts are its primary
source."1 94
B.

High Costs andLow Benefits of the Network Solution

The history of federal courts in the United States suggests that a
network of EU courts, located throughout the member states and
exercising original jurisdiction over EU claims, would strengthen the
integration of the European Union. A network would help to realize the
Osborn principle that a government should have a judicial system that is
adequate to enforce its law. But a radical change in the current EU
approach has costs as well as benefits. These costs must also be
considered. Such a system would produce greater costs and fewer benefits
in the European Union than in the United States, at least at present, because
of differences between the two polities.
1.

Benefits of a Network

Supreme Court case law identifies several justifications for federal
jurisdiction, including "the desirability of uniform interpretation, the
expertise of federal judges in federal law, and the assumed greater
hospitality of federal courts to peculiarly federal claims." 195 This model
seems to imply that the benefit of a network of EU courts is more
uniformity, expertise, and hospitality for EU law. In recent years, however,
analysts questioned whether the actual operation of the federal courts
yields all of these benefits.1 96
a.

Uniformity, Expertise, and Hospitality

Over time, both the body of federal law and the number of federal
judges have grown exponentially. The federal judiciary now consists of
more than eight hundred active judges, along with several hundred senior
193. See Louise Weinberg, The Monroe Mystery Solved: Beyond the "Unhappy History"
Theory of Civil Rights Litigation, 1991 BYU L. REv. 737.
194. Daniel J. Meltzer, The Judiciary'sBicentennial, 56 U. CH L. REV. 423,427 (1989).

195. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 464 (1990) (quoting Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 453 U.S. 473,483-84 (1981)).
196.

See Seinfeld, supra note 152, at 109-32; Preis, supra note 157, at 247-48.
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judges who still decide cases.' 97 State courts and federal administrative
agencies also decide federal issues. The multiplicity of decision makers as
well as the ever-increasing complexity of federal law belie "the notion that
the lower federal courts meaningfully advance the interest in a uniform
interpretation of federal law."1 98
Federal judges may have greater expertise in federal law since they
spend more of their time adjudicating federal law than do state judges, and
practice improves performance. The shortcoming of the "expertise"
rationale is the amount and variety of federal law. Federal judges
adjudicate lots of federal law, but in a wide range of contexts, such that
they rarely learn enough about any one area to claim expertise.1 99 The
argument is strong in certain contexts. For example, the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals specializes in patent law,200 among other things. 201But it
is unrealistic to expect federal judges to develop special skills in most areas
of federal law. For that matter, on some issues, such as Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendment rights, state judges may have a greater claim to
expertise since those rights are routinely adjudicated in state criminal
trials. By comparison, federal criminal law makes up a small part of the
federal docket.
The third policy underlying federal jurisdiction is more complex.
Professor Seinfeld occasionally uses the label "bias" to describe it. He
points out that bias exists at some periods and not others and that the bias
of a given set of judges may point in different directions depending on the
specific federal right at issue. He finds little evidence of state court bias
against federal claims today and concludes that the bias rationale is at least
as weak as uniformity and expertise. 202 But "bias" is a loaded word,
suggesting lack of impartiality and potentially setting up a straw man that
is easy to knock down. The Court's term is "hospitality,"2 03 which is a more
neutral way to characterize the federal interest in providing a federal
forum, across all federal substantive issues and all historical periods.

197.

Authorized Judgeships, U.S. COURTS (2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/

files/allauth.pdf.
198.

Seinfeld, supra note 152, at 115.

199.
200.
201.
202.

See id. at 124.
See id. at 130.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1295.
See Seinfeld, supra note 152, at 110-14.

203.

See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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The Federal Courts Franchise

Understood as hospitality, the value served by federal jurisdiction is
distinct from the interest in an impartial, unbiased forum. Across
substantive areas, state lines, and historical periods, litigants asserting
federal rights, especially in cases that challenge state official action on
federal grounds, have generally preferred federal court, especially in
litigation challenging state law on federal grounds. 204 The biggest reason
for preferring federal court is neither bias, nor uniformity, nor expertise. It
is that, by and large, federal judges differ from state judges in their stance
toward federal law. They approach federal questions with a "psychological
set" that disposes them to uphold federal constitutional values. 20 Expertise
aside, they bring a higher level of "technical competence" to federal
issues. 206 Because they are guaranteed tenure during "good behavior," 207
they are more insulated than state judges from majoritarian pressures. 20
Litigants, or their lawyers, are more comfortable in federal court.
Professor Seinfeld distinguishes this theme from bias, employs the
metaphor of a "franchise," and draws an apt analogy:
Just as many people value the ability to walk into a Starbucks store anywhere
in the country and have at least a general sense of what to expect in terms of
the menu and service, as well as the conventions and vocabulary pertinent
to getting what one wants, so do many litigants (and, more to the point, their
attorneys) value the opportunity to walk into a court and have a sense of
what to expect in terms of the services provided as well as the conventions
and vocabulary pertinent to litigating effectively.2 0 9

These considerations largely explain why litigants with federal claims
often choose federal court over state court and why state governments and
state officers typically try to channel constitutional litigation to state
courts.
This argument for EU federal courts with original jurisdiction is not
a backhanded way of accusing state courts in the United States, much less
the member state courts, of bias. It does not imply that member state courts
in the European Union will disobey the clear commands of EU law.210 The
204.

See Neuborne, supra note 102, at 1106.

205. Id. at 1124.
206. Id. at l120.
207. U.S. CoNST. art. III,
208.
209.
210.
especially

§ 1; see FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 9-10.
Neuborne, supra note 102, at 1127.
Seinfeld, supranote 152, at 133.
Evidence that a member state's courts ignore clear EU principles would furnish an
compelling ground for channeling litigation to EU courts, including courts of "first
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distinction drawn here between U.S. federal and state courts simply
acknowledges the reality that the two sets of courts bring different values,
experiences, and incentives to the task of adjudication of close cases that
do not have easy answers. Since there is no current network of lower EU
courts, there is no hard evidence that a similar divergence of preferences
would exist in litigation over EU issues. Still, many if not most member
state judges, like state judges in the United States, are politically or
culturally oriented toward member state values, and may not implement
EU law as vigorously as a hypothetical EU judiciary.
Richard Pildes calls this theme "institutional realism." 2 "' The premise
of institutional realism is that law is often indeterminate. Many matters are
not governed by a black letter rule or by drawing inferences from black
letter rules. Even when the rule is clear, the application of law to fact may
depend on the exercise ofjudicial discretion.2 12 Judges also have discretion
on other matters, such as the admission of arguably problematic evidence.
The cumulative impact of such rulings, by judges sharing the same
orientation, will move the law in one direction or the other. Thus,
"institutional realism ... entails constitutional and public-law doctrines
that penetrate the institutional black box and adapt legal doctrines to take
13
account of how these institutions actually function in, and over, time."

instance." Some have argued, for example, that courts in Hungary, Poland, and Romania violate
EU "rule of law" values. See, e.g., Anna Labedzka, The Rule of Law-A Weakening Lynchpin of
the European Union, in UNIV. MILAN-BICOCCA SCH. L., RSCH. PAPER SERIES NO. 20-03 (2020);

Fryderyk Zoll & Leah Wortham, Judicial Independence and Accountability: Withstanding
Political Stress in Poland, 42 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 875 (2019); Dimitry Kochenov, The EU and the
Rule of Law-Naivete or a Grand Design, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW:
BRIDGING IDEALISM AND REALISM (Maurice Adams et al. eds., 2017). A rough analogy is the
Supreme Court's response in the 1960s to courts in the South that often ignored or otherwise failed
to enforce federal constitutional and statutory civil rights. For documentation of the practices at
issue and efforts to combat them, see Anthony Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting
Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort
State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 793 (1965). For relevant Supreme Court cases see, e.g.,
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (easing access to federal court to sue state officers for
damages for constitutional violations); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (removing barriers to
federal habeas corpus suits to challenge state convictions); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479
(1965) (allowing access to federal court to challenge state prosecutions brought in bad faith to
harass civil rights workers).
211. Richard H. Pildes, Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and Public
Law, 2013 SUP. CT. REv. 1, 2 (2014).
212. Thus, many matters fall into the "open texture" of the law, in which judges use their
discretion and may reach divergent outcomes without any of them violating the law. See H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 123, 128-36 (2d ed. 1994).
213. Pildes, supra note 211.
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This rationale has proven to be durable in the United States, but it is
weaker in the EU context. The lower federal courts obtained their
"franchise" value through their performance over many decades. That
value has persuaded shifting political majorities in Congress and the
Supreme Court to adhere to a judgment that the benefits of a system of
lower federal courts are worth the federalism costs that come with it. In
the European Union, however, the value of an "EU lower court franchise"
is as purely hypothetical as the network itself. Like any franchise, that
value would not instantly appear when the network is created. It would be
lower than in the current United States, at least in the early years. As with
the U.S. federal courts, it would need to be earned over time. In addition,
whatever the value of such a network, the federalism costs of obtaining it
may be too high.
2.

Federalism Costs

In both the United States and the European Union, the federal courts
have the ultimate authority to decide federal issues, but the state courts are
similarly in charge of state law. A network of lower federal courts may
produce federalism costs when it adjudicates state law issues. In the United
States, federal diversity jurisdiction produces such costs, and is the source
of ongoing controversy, since it grants power to federal courts to decide
state law issues in suits between citizens of different states. 214 But lower
federal court jurisdiction over federal questions does not ordinarily
produce high federalism costs because the issues in most of these cases are
mainly governed by federal law. The general rule is that "[a] suit arises
under the law that creates the cause of action." 215 Congress has enacted
statutes that authorize suits to enforce many federal constitutional and
statutory rights, including constitutional claims against state officers, 2 16
antitrust, labor, and intellectual property. The federal causes of action
created by these statutes typically include federal rules for most of the
issues relevant to the litigation, either in the statutory text or by judicial
implication from the statutory text and purpose.
Litigation to enforce constitutional rights, brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, illustrates this point. The statute authorizes suits against "[e]very
person" who "under color of' state law violates federal constitutional

214. See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 192, at 143-53 (discussing the pros and cons of
diversity jurisdiction).

215. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
216. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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rights, as well as certain federal statutory rights. This statute, and judgemade federal law implementing it, determine who can be sued, what
remedies are available, what causal link the plaintiff must establish, and
available defenses. The main issue governed by state law is the statute of
limitations, which bars suits for lack of timeliness. 21 Otherwise, federal
law governs virtually every aspect of § 1983 litigation. Federal statutes
similarly cover the field for other areas of federal law. There is little room
for state law and thus few occasions on which federal courts would inflict
federalism costs by deciding state law issues.
Unlike the United States, EU law does not occupy the field in private
litigation, 218 because the European Union has not created private causes of
action to enforce EU law. Instead, the TEU and ECJ case law mandate that
the member states must provide adequate remedies for violations of EU
rights. 2 19 Setting up a network of lower EU courts and authorizing them to
adjudicate cases brought under member state law to enforce EU norms
carries a heavy federalism cost because member state law would govern
many of the issues in these cases. The closest U.S. analogy is litigation in
which state law provides a cause of action and federal law furnishes the
liability rule. The Supreme Court has generally rejected federal
220
jurisdiction for such cases because the federalism costs are too high.
Instead of EU causes of action, the body of EU law relevant to private
litigation consists mainly of constraints on member state law, which are
embodied in "regulations" and "directives." Regulations set boundaries on
the law of the member states, 22 1 and oblige member states to provide

217. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
218. Some types of EU litigation are governed entirely by EU law. See, e.g., LMG, supra
note 9, at 159 (suits brought by the European Commission against member states for
"infringement" of the member state's obligations under EU law); Id. at 253 (suits brought for
"annulment of assertedly illegal acts by EU institutions"). Both infringement and annulment suits
are litigated exclusively in EU courts.
219. See TEU, supra note 26, art. 19; LENAERTS & VAN NUFFEL, supra note 56, at 624;
GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 280-96 (collecting materials on "the adequacy of national
remedies").
220. See, e.g., Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013) (federal intellectual property issue
embedded in a state tort case, no federal jurisdiction); Merrell-Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478
U.S. 804 (1986) (federal pharmaceutical warning requirement embedded in state product liability
suit for failure to warn, no federal jurisdiction.) A "special and small category," Gunn, 568 U.S. at
258 (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677,699 (2006)), of suits
fitting this fact pattern are suitable for federal jurisdiction, but only when "the importance of the
issue to the federal system as a whole" can be shown. Gunn, 568 U.S. at 260.
221. See LENAERTS & VAN NEUFFEL, supra note 56, at 893.
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effective remedies for EU rights." These are similar to the types of
constraints placed on states by U.S. constitutional and statutory
restrictions. For example, Regulation 1612/68 imposes limits on the
member state's power to limit the free movement of workers among the
member states. 223 Directives are sometimes, though not necessarily, more
open-ended. They set goals the member states are expected to meet in their
own legislation. 2 24 A directive identifies a norm the member states must
achieve and gives them leeway in how the norm should be incorporated
into the member state's law.225 An illustration is the "Equal Pay Directive"
which defines "equal work" and "require[s] member states to undertake
vigorous enforcement of the right to equal pay."2 2 6 But a directive typically
leaves many details to the discretion of the member states. The "Products
Liability Directive" requires the member states to create causes of action
for product defect and includes definitions of defect. 2 7 But the member
states retain much authority to regulate product safety.228
In a products liability case, for example, one issue may be whether
the member state's rule meets the requirements of the EU directive;
another issue may be whether the product satisfies the member state's test
for a "state of the art" defense. If these cases are channeled to an EU court,
as they would be under the network approach, the EU court will be
charged with determining both the EU issues and the member state issues.
The federalism cost is that EU courts would sometimes misunderstand
member state law, just as U.S. federal courts sometimes misunderstand
state law. This kind of misunderstanding produces interference with the
implementation of state policy and unintentional corruption of the state's
222. See LMG, supra note 9, at 118; see also F.G. Wilman, The End of the Absence? The
Growing Body ofEULegislation on PrivateEnforcement and the Main Remedies It ProvidesFor,
53 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 887 (2016).
223. See GOEBEL ET AL., supranote 30, at 44748.
224. See LENAERTS & VAN NEUFFEL, supra note 56, at 896.
225. The treaty provision is TFEU Article 288, but the treaty does not define the term. See
GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 155; SACHA PRECHAL, DIRECTIVES IN EC LAW 13 (2005).
226. See GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 1308 (discussing Council Directive 75/117 of 10
Feb. 1975 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to the Application of

the Principle of Equal Pay for Men and women, 1975 O.J. (L 45) 19).
227. Council Directive 85/374 of July 25, 1985 on the Approximation of the Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for
Defective Products, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29.

228. See, e.g., Case C-183/00, Sanchez v. Medicina Asturiana SA, 2002 E.C.R. 1-03905
(upholding a Spanish law that provided more extensive rights for consumers than provided in the
Products Liability Directive); Case C-300/95, Commission v. United Kingdom, 1997 E.C.R. I2663 (rejecting the Commission's claim that the UK's version of the "state of the art defense"
violated the directive).
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doctrine-until and unless the error can be corrected. Even in the United
States, which already has a network, federal jurisdiction is generally
unavailable for similar tort cases. 2 2 9
3.

Friction Costs

Federal causes of action aside, U.S. federal law often resembles EU
2 30
law, interacting with state law rather than supplanting it altogether. In
both the United States and the European Union, many disputes raise both
federal and state issues. Yet it is usually impractical to cut up a piece of
23 1
litigation into component parts and send part of it to each system. In the
U.S., federal courts sometimes decide state issues and state courts
adjudicate federal issues. The federal issue may be a defense to a state law
claim, or an element in a state law cause of action.232 A consequence of
this overlap is that the parties to a dispute may each sue the other, one in
state court, the other in federal court.
Consider an illustrative case in which A and B make a contract that
may or may not be valid under federal antitrust law. When B fails to
perform, A sues in state court since his contract rights depend on state law.
The federal antitrust issue will be raised as a defense in state court. But to
complicate matters a bit, B sues A in federal court, claiming that the
contract is invalid under federal antitrust law.233 The federal court litigation
may require adjudication of state contract issues as well as federal antitrust
issues. In this scenario, a federal court might be required to decide any of
several questions raised by potential friction between the two pieces of
litigation, including: (1) Should the federal suit be dismissed in favor of
the state suit; (2) Should the state suit be enjoined in order to prevent
interference with the federal suit; (3) If the state suit is completed first,
should the federal court defer to the outcome? Answers that interfere with
the state court's enforcement of state law may have federalism costs.
In the United States, Congress and the Supreme Court have
developed a complex body of law to deal with these and other problems
229.

See supra note 220 and accompanying text.

230. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 488-89.
&

231. See Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM.
MARY L. REV. 605, 621 (1981).
232. See, e.g., Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013) (federal element in a state law claim is
generally not sufficient for federal jurisdiction); Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vomado Air Circulation Sys.,
535 U.S. 826 (2002) (federal issue must generally arise on the face of a well-pleaded complaint in
order to support federal jurisdiction).

233. Cf: Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977) (facts roughly similar to the
hypothetical case used in the text).

150

TULANE J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW

[Vol. 30

'

created by competing state and federal judiciaries. Federal courts are
required to give "full faith and credit" to state courts' resolution of federal
issues in earlier litigation involving the same parties and the same
dispute;2 34 litigants may not obtain lower federal court review of an earlier
state judgment;.. and federal courts may be required to defer to member
state court adjudication of matters at issue in ongoing litigation.23 Member
state courts may not enjoin federal court litigation,23 7 and a federal statute
allows federal courts to enjoin state litigation only in narrow
circumstances.2 3
This brief account omits many details which typically make up a
large chunk of a law school course on federal courts.23 9 A summary may,
however, be sufficient to make the point that a complicated body of law is
made necessary by the very existence of two lower court systems
operating at the same time in the same territory. The cost of managing the
systems is significant, even if resources needed to minimize the friction
between the two is well spent in the United States, which has already
committed itself to a dual judicial system.2 40 For EU policymakers, the
issue is whether to add a layer of courts. They should carefully consider
whether the benefits of a network of lower EU courts are worth the cost of
a substantial amount of litigation over competing claims to jurisdiction.
IV.

MEMBER STATE COURT ADJUDICATION OF EU ISSUES COUPLED
WITH ECJ REVIEW

Under TFEU Article 267, member state courts are told to refrain from
ruling on unsettled issues of EU law. Instead, they must refer those issues
to the ECJ 2 4' In practice, however, member state courts routinely decide
EU issues, without any oversight from the ECJ.2 42 From the perspective of
the ECJ, this body of member state doctrine has no precedential force.
234. 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
235. See Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Indust. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005).
236.

See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).

237.
238.

Donovan v. City of Dall., 377 U.S. 408 (1964).
Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs., 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
239. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 1061-1192, 1365-1411.
240. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and FederalLaw, 54 COLUM. L.
REv. 489,491 (1954).
241. TFEU, supra note 4. The "unsettled" qualifier derives from Case 283/81, Sri CILFIT
v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3417, 3430 ("[T]he correct application of Community law may
be so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt ... [such that] the national court or
tribunal [may] refrain from submitting the question to the Court of Justice.").
242. See Spirit of Cooperation,supra note 88, at 364-70.
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Nonetheless, these member state rulings in fact control the outcomes of
litigation and guide primary conduct. This approach works to the
disadvantage of both the member state courts and the European Union.
The institutional interest of the member state judiciary is to take part in the
elaboration of EU law, and the institutional interest of the ECJ is to
supervise and control the content of EU law. Yet under the current regime,
member state courts do not issue valid rulings on EU law, those rulings
nonetheless govern primary conduct, and the rulings cannot be reviewed
by an EU court.
This part of the Article proposes a hypothetical regime in which the
ECJ accepts the legitimacy of these member state holdings on EU law.
Crucially, that reform should be accompanied by replacing the preliminary
reference with ECJ appellate review of member state rulings on EU law.
The two reforms do not merely complement but support one another. ECJ
review presumes the legitimacy of the ruling under review. Allowing
member state courts to rule on EU law, without also authorizing appellate
review, compromises the integrity of EU law. Without ECJ review, a grant
of authority to the member state courts to determine EU issues would
result in lack of ECJ control over the content of EU law. Member state
courts would disagree among themselves. Some member state courts
would interpret EU law narrowly in ways that interfere with the realization
of EU policy. As a result, the content of EU law would become
increasingly incoherent over time.
In this alternative approach to EU judicial federalism, each side of
the federal state/ member state dichotomy gives up some of the authority
it holds, if only formally, under the current model. The ECJ cedes some of
its formal control over EU law. By comparison with the current situation,
however, the ECJ loses little substantive power since member state courts
already adjudicate EU issues. The member state judiciaries give up their
independence from ECJ review, but that loss of authority only extends to
EU issues. In evaluating the comparative merits of the current regime and
the proposed reform, the choice is not between member state adjudication
and no member state adjudication. It is between the "limited oversight"
approach currently followed and an approach that would both affirm and
constrain the practice of member state adjudication. The advantage of the
proposed reform over current law is that, as matters stand today, member
state courts adjudicate EU law without any appellate review. On the one
hand, these rulings lack the status of EU law as they are not recognized as
legitimate by the ECJ; on the other, the ECJ has no ready opportunity to
review them in order to assure their correctness.
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This proposal is not a perfect solution to the problem of balancing
ECJ control of EU law against respect for member state sovereignty. Both
of those goals are compromised. But the history of judicial federalism in
the United States belies the notion that there may be a perfect solution. The
aim should be to obtain many of the benefits of a stronger EU judiciary,
but to do so at a cost that is acceptable to member states, many of whom
favor a prominent role for state judiciaries. To that end, one virtue of the
appellate review model, discussed in Section A, is enhanced integration of
member state judiciaries into EU governance. Another, discussed in
Section B, is more effective ECJ oversight of member state court decisions
on EU law.
Section C addresses the costs of moving to the appellate-review
model. The abandonment of ECJ exclusivity may diminish the authority
of the ECJ given the ECJ's acknowledgement that member state courts
also contribute to deciding EU issues. That cost, however, is mainly formal
rather than substantive since the member state courts already adjudicate
EU law. A more significant federalism cost is that appellate review entails
ECJ supervision of member state judiciaries, arguably to the detriment of
their control over member state law. On this point, the U.S. experience is
instructive. Absent special circumstances, the Supreme Court's oversight
extends only to state court outcomes that turn on federal law and only to
the federal issues adjudicated in those cases. Thus, the appellate review
model would not entail undue ECJ interference with the member state
judiciaries' ability to control member state law. A distinct issue is whether
ECJ appellate review implies the "primacy" of EU law over member state
law. Though the ECJ holds that view, there is no necessary link between
appellate review and primacy. The appellate review model could be
adopted without endorsing EU primacy.
A.

Member State CourtAdjudication ofEU Law

State court adjudication of federal issues, coupled with Supreme
Court review, has been the U.S. approach since 1789. Article III implicitly
accepted state court adjudication by mandating the creation of "one
supreme Court" while leaving the existence and role of lower federal
courts up to Congress.243 Though Article III does not explicitly provide for
Supreme Court review, Alexander Hamilton surmised in Federalist No. 82
that "an appeal would certainly lie from the [state courts] to the Supreme

243.

U.S. CONST. art. III,

§ 1; see FALLON ET AL. supra note 12, at

7-8.
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Court." 2 4 Endorsing Hamilton's view, Congress authorized the Supreme
Court to review state judgments in section 25 of the Judiciary Act of
1789.245 The Supreme Court upheld section 25 against constitutional
objections in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee in 1816.246 The history of U.S.
judicial federalism suggests that this regime-federal law in state courts
coupled with Supreme Court review of state court judgments-is a
workable model for reform of EU judicial institutions.
1.

Promoting EU Integration

Like the member state courts in the European Union, the state courts
pre-exist the United States. The state courts took over the role of colonial
2 47 State courts
courts when the Americans declared their independence.
operated for a decade or more as the courts of sovereign states before the
constitutional convention in 1787.248 The U.S. Constitution's framers took
the view that the state courts would adjudicate federal issues unless
2 49
Congress displaced them by providing for exclusive federal jurisdiction.
In Federalist No. 82, Alexander Hamilton wrote that the state courts not
only retain their pre-existing jurisdiction, but also have jurisdiction over
federal cases unless Congress provided otherwise. 2 1 In the core passage
of this essay, Hamilton explained why the state courts would adjudicate
federal law: they would do so because "the State governments and the
national government [were] parts of ONE WHOLE."2 5" Acting on this
view, the framers conceived of the state judiciaries as integral parts of the
new judicial system. In the 1789 Judiciary Act, Congress provided for
exclusive federal jurisdiction only over federal criminal cases, certain suits

244.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 493 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

245.

1 Stat. 73, 85 (Sept. 24, 1789).

246.
247.

Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1Wheat.) 304 (1816).
See generally SCOTT GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER: THE ORIGINS OF AN

INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, 1606-1787 xiv (2011) ("[C]hronicling how the original 13 states and their
colonial antecedents treated their respective judiciaries.").
248. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-87, at 45363 (1969) (describing the work of state courts during this period); JEFFREY S. SUTTON ET AL., STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE MODERN EXPERIENCE 931-49 (2010) (describing post-Revolution state
constitutional developments, which included judicial provisions).
249. See Charles Warren, New Light on the JudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 65

(1923).
250.
251.

THE FEDERALIST No. 82, supra note 244, at 492-93 (Alexander Hamilton).
Id. at 493.

154

TULANE J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW

[Vol. 30

"against consuls or vice-consuls," and admiralty cases, but not, for
example, over "suits at common law where the United States sue."2 52
General "federal question" jurisdiction did not become established
until Congress authorized federal jurisdiction over cases "arising under"
federal law in 1875.253 In construing the 1875 statute and other
jurisdictional provisions, the Supreme Court has always declined to
interpret the statute as expansively as Article III allows. It has done so
despite some evidence that the legislative intent was to authorize federal
district court jurisdiction to the Article III limits.254 Osborn had held that
Article III allows federal jurisdiction whenever federal law is an
"ingredient" in the case. 55 Yet the Court has interpreted the statute in ways
that keep many federal issues in the state courts, even when they are
central to the litigation. For example, federal defenses are typically
adjudicated in state court,256 as are most federal issues that arise in the
adjudication of state law causes of action.25 Even when the cause of action
is authorized by federal law, the Supreme Court has generally rejected
exclusive federal jurisdiction unless Congress has explicitly required it or
given clear indication of legislative intent. 258
This approach tells the state courts that they have "been entrusted
with a great and important task," and thus "evoke[s] ... a sense of
responsibility." 25 9 The message is that state courts are trusted both to apply
federal law and to resolve unsettled federal issues when the occasion
arises. In the United States, the path toward federal-state harmony has not
always been smooth. Over the course of U.S. history, the integration of
state and federal courts into "one whole" judicial system has produced
friction between state courts and lower federal courts, as both systems
252. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,

§ 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77. For a discussion of "how the

framers ofthe First Judiciary Act dealt with the ... capacity of non-Article III tribunals to entertain
Article III business," see Michael G. Collins, The FederalCourts, the First Congress, and the NonSettlement of 1789, 91 VA. L. REV. 1515, 1520 (2005).
253. Act of March 1, 1875, §§ 2-3, 18 Stat. 335-36; see also FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra
note 178, at 65; FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 779-82 (noting the brief period in 1801-02 in
which Congress adopted and then revoked general federal question jurisdiction).
254. See FALLON ETAL., supra note 12, at 807-08.
255. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
256. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (stating the rule
that federal jurisdiction is ordinarily available only if the federal issue arises on the face of a "wellpleaded" complaint, i.e., one which does not anticipate defenses).
257. See, e. g., Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013) (federal intellectual property issue
embedded in a state law malpractice case).

258. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990).
259.

Bator, supra note 231, at 605, 624.
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have vied for jurisdiction over particular matters.2 60 During periods when
Congress and the federal courts have expanded the scope of federal
constraints on the states, the friction has sometimes produced considerable
tension between federal and state courts. 2 6 ' The "appellate review" model
for the European Union may not implement federal policy as well as
federal district court jurisdiction, 26 2 but there is a trade-off. The appellatereview model also avoids much of the friction since member state courts
would not face competition from a network of lower federal courts. In this
sense, the process of integration might proceed more smoothly in the
European Union than it has in the United States.
On the other hand, differences between the United States and the
European Union point toward greater difficulties in integrating member
state courts into "one whole" EU judiciary. The United States began as a
union of thirteen states that shared a common language, history, and
culture. They had fought together to win independence from Great Britain.
After independence, they all kept the English common law as the bases
for their legal systems.2 6 3 During the war for independence, they had
already seen the need for some sort of union by drafting the Articles of
Confederation.2 " Just a few years into the regime of the Articles, the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 was prompted by general recognition
that a stronger form of union was needed.26 ' But advocates of a less
centralized government also helped to shape the document. With respect
to the judiciary, it was probably inevitable that the framers reached a
compromise in which the state and federal legal systems would constitute
"one whole" since both sides of the debate exerted considerable
pressure. 266
The European Union was formed by nation states with different
languages, legal systems, and cultures. Each of them had a long pre-EU
history and a distinctive national identity. A prominent feature of their
common history was that they had fought among themselves for centuries,
and the wars included two recent ones that devastated Europe. A major
rationale for stronger union was the need to protect some members from
260.
261.

See supraPart 1i.A.
See Neuborne, supra note 102, at 1106-15.

262. See id. at 11 16 nn. 45-46.
263. See William B. Stoebuck, Reception of English Common Law in the American

Colonies, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393 (1968).
264. See WOOD, supra note 248, at 354-63; RICHARD B. MoRRIS, THE FORGING OF
UNION 1781-89, at 80 (1987).
265. See WOOD, supranote 248, at 393.
266. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 7-9.
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aggression by others. It is no accident that the European Union grew out
of the "European Coal and Steel Community," an institution devised after
World War II in order to take away from governments, especially the
German government, control over the basic materials of war.2 67 At the
outset of the European Union, it was inconceivable that the judicial
systems of the member states and the judicial system of the European
Union could be "one whole." As originally conceived, the Common
Market was the product of an international agreement, albeit one that
promised especially close ties among the signatory states. 268 Thus, the
agreement was called a treaty and remains such, despite an aborted effort
in the early 2000s to adopt a "constitution."2 69 The rule that only the ECJ
could decide issues of EC law followed the standard practice in
international relations in which only an international court could decide
issues of treaty interpretation. Since the EEC Treaty creates obligations
only for the member state, not its citizens, jurisdiction was lodged in a
court that was staffed by judges from all the signatories of the treaty,
separate from their legal systems. 270
Over time, the economies and cultures of EU member states grew
more integrated, to the benefit of all. The European Union was
transformed into a distinctive polity, not quite a nation state but much
closer to one than at the outset.2 7 1 Yet the EU's judicial institutions are little
changed. Article 267 of the TFEU, stating the rule that only the ECJ may
decide issues of EU law, is an artifact of the earlier era.2 72 It is hardly
radical to propose that the EU's judicial architecture should reflect the
"transformation of Europe."
The current approach sends a clear message that the European Union
is a distinct entity from the member states, so much so that member state
courts have no contribution to make to the corpus of EU law. For example,
the ECJ held, in Foto-Frostv. HauptzollamtLubeck-Ost, that the member
267. See LEONARD, supra note 57, at 4-5.
268. See, e.g., Mancini, supra note 77, at 595-96 ("Unlike the United States, the EC was
born as a peculiar form of international organization.... [T]he instrument giving rise to the
Community was a traditional multilateral treaty."); M. Rasmussen, supra note 76, at 156 & n.113;
Jan Klabbers, Straddlingthe Fence: The EU and International Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 52 (Anthony Amull & Damian Chalmers eds., 2015) (stating that,
though the EU was "[s]et up as an international organization ... [it] is no longer generally regarded
as a normal international organization").
269. See GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 23-24.
270. See Weiler, supra note 85, at 2413-14.

271. See id. at 2405-10.
272. See GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 67 (noting that the current rule can be traced back
to the original treaty).
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state courts "do not have the power to declare acts of the Community
institutions invalid," even on the ground that the EU measure violates
higher EU law. 2 73 The ECJ approach rejects a valuable insight of U.S.
judicial federalism. It tells member state judges that "to the greatest
possible extent, all the important shots will be called by someone else,"
and thereby discourages member state judges from "feel[ing] institutional
responsibility for vindicating [EU] rights." 274
2.

Interpretive Pluralism

TEU Article 19 declares that the "Court of Justice of the European
Union shall ... ensure that in the interpretation and application of the
Treaties the law is observed." 275 That obligation does not necessarily
exclude a role for the member state courts as well. In the United States,
the benefits of welcoming the contributions of state judges are shared by
the whole judicial system. Since state courts bring a distinctive perspective
to bear on the resolution of federal issues, 276 their participation enables all
courts, including the Supreme Court, to take account of the whole range
of factors that bear on the development of doctrine. The current EU
approach of Article 267-that the ECJ and other EU judicial institutions
alone adjudicate EU law-seems to rest on the premise that law making
is a strictly positivist project, 277 "which conceives of lawmaking in
hierarchical terms and sees fidelity to law primarily as a matter of
278
complying with pronouncements coming from a higher authority." The
value of reliance on a wider array of courts emerges when it is understood
that lawmaking is better viewed as "a cooperative enterprise," in which
each member of "a moral and legal community ... [is] reciprocally
279
charged with the mutual and reciprocal elaboration" of legal principles.
In the European Union, as in the United States, that community includes
the member state courts.

273. Case 314/85, 1987 E.C.R. 4225, 4231.
274. Bator, supra note 231, at 624-25.
275. TEU, supra note 26, art. 19.
276. See Bator, supranote 231, at 633-34; cf GARETH Davies, InterpretivePluralism Within
EU Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON LEGAL PLURALISM AND EU LAw 332 (Gareth Davies & Mtej
Avbelj eds., 2018) (championing "interpretive pluralism," which endorses the notion that member
state courts may disagree among themselves indefinitely, and to some extent with the ECJ, on EU
issues).
277. See Davies, supra note 276.
278. Bator, supra note 231, at 634.

279. Id.
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Transitioning From Preliminary Reference to Appellate Review

If preliminary reference worked as Article 267 and ECJ directives
seem to envision, the ECJ would never have the benefit of member state
rulings on EU law. In practice, many such rulings exist despite Article 267
and the ECJ's doctrine, 2 0 and those rulings are available to the ECJ if it
chooses to study them. But appellate review has other advantages. One is
that, in contrast to preliminary reference, appellate review puts the parties,
not the lower court, in charge of identifying and framing issues for review.
Unlike the state judge, whose motivations may be varied,28 ' the parties
have a keen interest in the outcome and a strong incentive to give close
attention to the potential relevance of federal law. In the United States, this
value underlies the law of "standing to sue," which requires litigants to
demonstrate "a personal stake" 282 and a "distinct and palpable injury"2 83 in
order to raise federal issues. Member state judges are comparatively illsuited to the task. They are trained in local law and habituated to its use.
The judge is less likely to discover an EU issue, or to appreciate the
relevance of an EU issue, even if a party points it out. Or the judge may
perceive that EU law is relevant but present the question imprecisely.
By accepting the legitimacy of member state adjudication of EU
issues, the ECJ would affirm that the member state judiciaries are not
merely functionaries who carry out commands received from the ECJ, but
full-fledged participants in the larger EU judicial system. From the
perspective of European integration, there is a significant difference
between calling the GFCC's May 5, 2020 Weiss ruling the illegitimate act
of a renegade court, as current ECJ doctrine seems to imply, and treating
that ruling as an effort to interpret the EU treaties, even if the outcome is
mistaken. Moreover, the appellate review model provides an opportunity
for the ECJ to correct the mistake rather than merely complain about it. 28 4

280. See Kornezov, supra note 118, at 1318 ("[E]xperience has shown that, as current EU
law and practice stand, the obligation to refer under Article 267(3) TFEU is, essentially,
unenforceable.").
281. See Marie-Pierre F. Granger, When Governments Go to Luxembourg: The Influence of
Governments on the Court ofJustice, 29 EUR. L. REv. 3, 28-31 (2004) (discussing the influence of
governments on preliminary references).

282. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
283. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
284.

See supranotes 1-5 and accompanying text.
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ECJReview of Member State Judgments

Under TFEU Article 267, the respective roles of the ECJ and the
member state courts are clearly defined: (1) The member state courts may
not declare EU law invalid, 8 ' and (2) the ECJ does not exercise appellate
review member over state judgments.2 6 If (1) accurately described the
practices of member state courts, (2) would make sense. But the realworld EU legal system does not work that way. Member state courts do in
fact resolve issues of EU law, or else ignore its relevance to the case at
hand. They also fmd facts that bear on EU issues and apply EU law to
those facts. 287 Still, fidelity to the current "no appellate review" regime
might be defended on the ground that the member state court
determinations of EU law are illegitimate exercises of judicial power and
thus should be ignored. In Section A, I have argued that the better approach
is to accept reality and authorize member state rulings on EU law.
That step should be coupled with ECJ appellate review. Taken alone,
legitimation of member state adjudication of EU issues probably creates
more problems than it would solve. Even though "preliminary reference"
would be an option, member state courts would face no adverse
consequences from foregoing it. 288 It is highly predictable that member
state courts would differ among themselves in their rulings on EU law,
would sometimes misunderstand or misapply EU legal materials, and
would sometimes fail to give EU norms the weight they deserve. With the
"network" solution excluded on account of high federalism costs and low
benefits in the EU context,2 89 appellate review is the only viable way to
meet the need for access to an EU forum for EU issues.
1.

Systemic Benefits of the Appellate-Review Model

This proposed change in the ECJ's jurisdiction inevitably faces stiff
2 90
resistance since it would intrude on member state courts' prerogatives.
285. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
286. It may, however, review those judgments in an "infringement" action. See GOEBEL ET
AL., supra note 30, at 91-114. For example, the Commission has sued Germany on account of the
GFCC's May 5, 2020 ruling. See supra note 4.
287. See Spirit of Cooperation,supra note 88, at 364-74.
288. As noted above, see supra note 286, the European Commission might bring an
"infringement" action, but the defendant in such a case is the member state, not the court. The
decision as to whether to bring an infringement action is for the Commission, not the parties. See
TFEU, supra note 4, art. 258.
289. See supra Part V.C.
290. Cf Jeffrey C. Cohen, The European PreliminaryReference and U.S. Supreme Court
Review ofJState CourtJudgments:A Study in ComparativeJudicialFederalism,44 AM. J. COMPAR.
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It would also require the member state courts to acknowledge that the
European Union is not merely an arrangement among signatories to a
treaty,29' even if the European Union is not precisely described as a federal
state.292 Still, the appellate-review model is a comparatively mild
encroachment. It takes less authority away from the member state courts
than does the "network" alternative described in Part III since it allows
access to an EU court only after the facts were found and the law was
applied to the facts. It would provide the litigant with an EU claim only an
"insecure remedy .. . upon an insulated point, after [the case] has received
that shape which may be given to it by another tribunal, into which he is
forced against his will."2 93 It would, however, take a significant step
beyond the current preliminary reference process (1) in assuring the
uniformity of EU law, (2) in correcting member state courts' errors as to
the content of EU law, (3) in providing access to a forum that is
sympathetic to the principles, values, and goals of EU law, and (4) in
reinforcing the ECJ's legitimacy.
These goals are distinct. Each contributes value in a system of
appellate review. Suppose that all the member state courts ruled the same
way on a given point, thus satisfying uniformity, and suppose the uniform
rule favored EU values at the expense of member state interests, thus
satisfying sympathy. The member state courts should still be accountable
to the ECJ. In this hypothetical case, they all may have given too much
weight to EU values, and too little to the member states' goals, and thus
reached the wrong outcome. Thus, in a somewhat analogous context, the
U.S. Supreme Court must choose which cases it will review out of
thousands of petitions of certiorari. The Court has rejected the notion that
it should only accept cases in which the putative federal right-holder was
L. 421, 445 (1996) ("A system of appellate review was of course unacceptable to the original
Member States ... ").
291. Susanna Cafaro has pointed out to me that a long and consolidated case law supports
this proposition. For a classic article on the point, see Weiler, supra note 85, at 2407 (1991) ("[The
EU's] "closest structural model is no longer an international organization but a denser, yet
nonunitary polity, principally the federal state.").
292. For example, the German Federal Constitutional Court would be obliged to modify its
assertion that "the Member States . .. remain the masters of the Treaties." BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08,
June 30, 2009, para. 207, https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/

2009/06/es20090630_2bve000208en.pdf?

blob=publicationFile&v=1.

Under the appellate-

review model, the ECJ would have the final word on interpretation of the treaties, cf Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (asserting Supreme Court authority to finally interpret the U.S.
Constitution), though of course the member states may amend them, and a member state may
choose to withdraw from the European Union. See TEU, supra note 26, art. 50.

293.

Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822-23 (1824).
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the loser below.2 94 It has instead chosen to give other factors, such as
maintaining the uniformity and correctness of federal law, at least as much
weight as guaranteeing a sympathetic forum. 295 Perhaps the most
important criterion is whether the ruling at hand creates a split among
lower courts.296
2.

Sociological Legitimacy and the ECJ

The fourth point, on legitimacy, involves the ECJ's institutional
interest in guaranteeing that it is taken seriously by the member states, their
judiciaries, and other audiences. A court's legitimacy depends in part on
its fidelity to legal and moral norms, but also on whether its rulings are
29 7
"accepted (as a matter of fact) as deserving of respect or obedience." In
2 98
this latter sense, which Richard Fallon calls "sociological legitimacy,"
the GFCC ruling in Weiss is a serious threat. The GFCC "would very
comfortably accept the compliment of being primus inter pares among
2 99
constitutional courts in Europe and, come to think of it, well beyond."
By defying the ECJ, the GFCC sent a message that it does not consider
the ECJ ruling deserving of respect, obedience, or even acquiescence. The
ruling implicitly invites others to follow its example, perhaps across a
range of cases involving issues that touch daily life more than the bondbuying question at issue in Weiss.
In the late 1950s, the U.S. Supreme Court faced a roughly analogous
situation when state courts in the South refused to follow its rulings on
school desegregation. But the Supreme Court had more effective means
than the ECJ to enforce its holdings and bolster its sociological legitimacy.
In Cooper v. Aaron,300 the Governor of Arkansas defied Brown v. Boardof
Education,30' declared a high school "off-limits" to Black students, and
deployed the National Guard to enforce his orders. In an opinion signed
294.

Before 1914, a federal statute limited the Court's authority to review state judgments

to such cases. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 462.
295. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
296. See FALLON ETAL., supra note 12, at 464.
297. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1790
(2005); see also Bobek, supra note 124, at n.2 (legitimacy might be measured by "voluntary
compliance, acceptance or willingness to follow").
298. See Fallon, supra note 297, at 1827-33.
299. Editorial Comments, Not Masteringthe Treaties: The German Federal Constitutional
Court'sPSPPJudgment, 57 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 965, 965 (2020).

300. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
301. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down racially-segregated public education on Equal
Protection grounds).
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by all nine Justices, the Supreme Court addressed a "claim by the
Governor and Legislature of a State that there is no duty on state officials
to obey federal court orders resting on this Court's considered
interpretation of the United States Constitution."0 2 The Court's response
was that, contrary to Arkansas's position, "the federal judiciary is supreme
in the exposition of the law of the Constitution."" 3 Although Cooper did
not involve an appeal from a defiant state court, the Court unequivocally
signaled that it would reverse state court rulings at odds with Brown.
Maintaining the kind of sociological legitimacy that comes from
compliance is a challenge for any court that addresses its orders to
governments. 304 Cooperwas backed up by President Eisenhower, who had
sent federal troops to Little Rock, Arkansas to enforce judicially decreed
desegregation.3 0 The ECJ is in a far weaker position. Lacking both an
army and the power of appellate review, the ECJ could only respond with
a public statement deploring the GFCC's decision. 306 If the legitimacy of
ECJ rulings were solidly established, an errant member state ruling might
do little damage. But the ECJ's legitimacy is a lively topic of debate,307
and the extent to which member state courts follow ECJ rulings in the
"thousands of dull tax cases, consumer protection actions, common
customs tariff classification disputes, trans-border enforcement of small
civil claims, companies' shareholder quarrels and so on" is unknown.3 08
Before Weiss, the Czech Constitutional Court and the Danish Supreme
Court had disobeyed the ECJ. 309 Weiss, however, is "the most significant"
instance of disobedience, "touching on a politically divisive matter in a
field where the EU enjoys exclusive competence." 310 Critics of the GFCC
ruling argue that the ECJ is "the final arbiter in matters concerning the
interpretation and application of the Treaties." 31 But that assertion rings
hollow if the Court is helpless to enforce its interpretations by way of
appellate review.
302. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 4.
303. Id. at 18.
304. See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law,
ConstitutionalLaw, PublicLaw, 122 HARv. L. REV. 1791, 1822 (2009).
305. See JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 153-54 (1981).
306. See Fleming & Arnold, supra note 129.
307. For an example of various arguments regarding ECJ legitimacy, see JUDGING EUROPE'S
JUDGES: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE EXAMINED,

supra note 124.
308. Bobek, supra note 124, at 201.
309. See Editorial Comments, supra note 299, at 965 n.2.

310. Id. at 965.
311. Id. at 966.

2022]
C.

EUROPEAN UNION LAW

163

Costs of the Appellate-Review Model

The benefits of appellate review must be balanced against its costs.
Two federalism-based objections to this proposal require attention: (1) that
appellate review unduly threatens the sovereignty of member states, and
(2) that it obliges the member states to accept the "primacy" of EU law.
1.

Sovereignty and Accountability

EU affirmation of the legitimacy of member state rulings on EU law
would be a double-edged sword for the member state courts. That shift
recognizes that the member state courts are full-fledged participants in the
project of building a more fully integrated European Union. But the price
of that recognition is that their rulings on EU law should be subject to
appellate review. One rationale for appellate review is that they may make
mistakes in deciding open issues of EU law. Absent review, their errors on
EU law could not be corrected and the aims of EU law could be frustrated.
Another justification for review is the systemic value of accountability.
Every government institution should answer to some other authority, in
order to minimize the risk that it will abuse its power. 12 Thus, the ECJ is
subject to the authority of the member states, who may amend the Treaty
to curb what they regard as abuse or incompetence. 313 The member states
may be checked by the Commission, which may sue them for
"infringement" of their Treaty obligations." Member state courts are
subject to their States' legislative and constitutional processes when they
adjudicate member state law. Under present practice, member state courts
decide EU issues with no accountability to anyone.
An objection to holding member state courts accountable in this way
is that the proposed reform takes away some of the member state courts'
sovereign power. Early in U.S. history, this objection was advanced
against U.S. Supreme Court review. The Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, in response to a U.S. Supreme Court reversal of its holding in a
312. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 320 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961)
(arguing that "the necessary partition of power" among government institutions can be achieved
"by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may,
by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places"). See also
COENEN, supra note 35, at 107 (discussing the system of checks and balances in the U.S.
Constitution).
313. See Gareth Davies, Legislative Control of the European Court ofJustice, 51 COMMON
MKT. L. REv. 1579 (2014) (acknowledging that amendment of the treaties is the main avenue for
controlling the ECJ but suggesting possible legislative actions as well).
314. See TFEU, supra note 4, art. 258.
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dispute over title to a vast tract of land, 315 declined to obey. Writing for the
Virginia Supreme Court in Hunter v. Martin, Judge Cabell said:
[B]efore one Court can dictate to another, the judgment it shall pronounce,
it must bear, to that other, the relation of an appellate Court. The term
appellate, however, necessarily includes the idea of superiority. But one
Court cannot be correctly said to be superior to another, unless both of them
belong to the same sovereignty. . . . [The] Courts of the United States,
therefore, belonging to one sovereignty, cannot be appellate Courts in
relation to the State Courts, which belong to a different sovereignty." 316

In response, the U.S. Supreme Court again reversed, in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, the case that established once and for all the validity of Supreme
Court review of state judgments. 3" In Hunter's Lessee, the Court
acknowledged, and indeed relied on, the proposition that the U.S.
Constitution meant to "deprive [the states] altogether of the exercise of
some powers of sovereignty." 3 1' 8
Intrusion on member state sovereignty would be a cost of ECJ
appellate review, just as it was in the United States. U.S. practice, however,
shows that this cost can be a limited one. The Osborn rationale for access
to federal court applies only to federal law, and the Supreme Court has
carefully limited its review of state court judgments to cases that turn on
federal law.319 Following these principles, member state courts'
accountability to the ECJ should be narrowly confined. It should extend
only to rulings on EU law and then only to issues that influence the
outcome. On matters of EU law, but only on those matters, the member
states have already given up sovereignty by signing on to the TEU, just as
the American states gave up some sovereignty by ratifying the U.S.
Constitution.32 0
The federalism problem raised by appellate review is that, like much
federal law in the United States, the aspects of EU law litigated in the
member state courts are typically intertwined with member state issues.
315. See Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1812).
316. See, e.g., Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munif. 1) 1, 12 (1815), rev'd, Martin v. Hunter's

Lessee, 14
317.
318.
319.

U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
d. at 328.
See, e.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935). Earlier the Court had held

that, absent special circumstances, only the federal issues in a case would be subject to Supreme

Court review. See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).
320. See Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. at 325 ("[T]he sovereign powers vested in the state
governments ... remained unaltered and unimpaired, except so far as they were granted to the
government of the United States.").
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The danger is that the ECJ, in the course of appellate review, will meddle
in matters of member state law, on which it has no authority. For example,
one issue may be whether or not a member state regulation violates EU
rules against discrimination against out-of-state products, while another
issue is whether the member state regulation in fact applies to the situation
that gave rise to the litigation. The former is an EU issue, the latter a
member state issue. In the United States, similar entwinements are routine.
A state criminal case may involve issues of state criminal law and criminal
procedure as well as federal constitutional regulation of the state criminal
process. Appellate review of member state rulings in such cases raises the
concern that the appellate court-whether it be the U.S. Supreme Court or
the ECJ-will review not only the state court's holdings on federal law but
its holdings on state law as well. The latter type of review would violate
the federalism principle that the member state is sovereign over member
state law.
This problem is to draw lines between issues that are and are not
within the ECJ's purview. The ECJ may profit from the Supreme Court's
efforts to deal with the parallel issue in U.S. judicial federalism. The Court
has worked out a body of principles that distinguish between the set of
cases that depend on federal law, for which Supreme Court review is
justified, and those which turn entirely on state law, for which review
should be denied. In order to illustrate the Supreme Court's rule, consider
a version of the hypothetical case described in the preceding paragraph, in
which the member state court issues two rulings: (a) that EU law forbids
regulating the product in question, and (b) that the state's rule does not
cover this product. If the ECJ were to adopt the Supreme Court's approach,
it would not review the judgment because the outcome of the litigation
would be the same no matter how (a) is decided. Put another way, (b) a
ruling on member state law, is adequate to support the judgment in favor
of the seller. In the jargon of U.S. Supreme Court review, the state ground
would be "independent .. . and adequate" to sustain the judgment because
any ruling on the EU issue would not affect the outcome.32 ' Now suppose
the member state court had decided that the state's rule does cover the
product. In that case, the EU issue would be decisive and, thus, reviewed.
Even in that case, however, the ECJ would not address (b), the issue of
member state law.

321. Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935).
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The "Primacy" Issue

'

Article VI of the United States Constitution declares that federal law
is "supreme."322 In practice this means that state law is always subordinate
to federal law. Any inconsistency between the two is fatal to the validity
of state law.3 2 3 The issue of how EU-member state conflicts should be
resolved is not so clear-cut. 324 The TEU includes a "principle of sincere
cooperation," under which the "Member States shall take any appropriate
measure ... to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the
Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union," 321
which is sometimes called a "duty of loyalty." 326 The ECJ holds that this
provision signifies the "primacy" of EU law,3 27 and "primacy" suggests, if
it does not imply, supremacy. For example, in a leading case on the topic,
the ECJ said that "the law stemming from the Treaty ... could not, because
of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal
provisions."328 Some of the member states endorse the ECJ's view.321
Others agree that EU law overrides ordinary member state legislation but
reject EU primacy when EU law conflicts with the fundamental law of the
member state. Germany, the most powerful member state, is in this
group, 330 as are the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Denmark. 33
322. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
323. See FELDMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 28, at 285. For a discussion of the implications
of federal supremacy for the law of judicial federalism, see JAMES E. PFANDER, ONE SUPREME
COURT: SUPREMACY, INFERIORITY, AND THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES xi-xii (2009)
(taking an ambitious view of federal power).
324. See Monica Claes, The Primacy of EU Law in European and National Law, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW, supra note 268, at 178 (noting that "primacy
remains sensitive and contested").
325. TEU, supra note 26, art. 4.

326. See GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 134.
327. See, e.g., Case 48/71, Commission v. Italy, 1972 E.C.R. 527; Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente
Nazionale Energia Elettrica (ENEL), 1964 E.C.R. 587; see also LENAERTS & VAN NUFFEL, supra
note 56, at 633.

328. Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 594.
329. See GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 309-12 (discussing Belgian decisions and stating,
that others in this camp "apparently include Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Slovak Republic,
Bulgaria, Romania, the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), Cyprus, and Malta"). Id. at

312.
330. See, e.g., BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, June 30, 2009, paras. 204, 209-12 (holding the Act
Approving the Treaty of Lisbon (Zustimmungsgesetz zum Vertrag von Lissabon) is compatible
with the German constitution, otherwise known as "Basic Law").
331. See GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 325-26; see also Rostane Mehdi, French Supreme
Courts and European Union Law: Between Historical Compromise and Accepted Loyalty, 48
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 439 (2011) (discussing the complexities of the French approach to
primacy); Armin von Bogdandy & Stephan Schill, Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for
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The primacy of EU law is not the focus of this Article. 332 But the topic
cannot be avoided entirely because the primacy issue is related to ECJ
review of member state courts. As Judge Cabell pointed out in Hunter v.
Martin, when one court hears appeals from another court's rulings, the
relationship is that of a superior authority to an inferior because the
appellate court can override the court from which the appeal is taken.33 3
Thus, ECJ review would imply a hierarchical relationship in which the
ECJ outranks the member state courts. The ECJ's assertion of the primacy
of EU law would hold sway in situations in which member state law
conflicted with EU law, just as it does today in ECJ rulings on preliminary
references. Arguably, the "appellate review" approach would strengthen
the ECJ's position vis-a-vis the GFCC and other member state courts that
reject full primacy.
Nonetheless, adoption of the appellate review model does not
concede full primacy to EU law over member state law. The two issues
are not logically linked to one another, such that primacy of EU law over
member state law necessarily follows once preliminary reference is
replaced by a system of ECJ appellate review." 4 Appellate review serves
at least two functions: (a) it enables a central government to control the
content of central government law; and (b) it enables a central government
to maintain the supremacy of central government law over competing state
law. The former does not necessarily imply the latter.
The distinction between (a) and (b) is between judicial hierarchy and
substantive-law hierarchy. Appellate review of EU issues involves the
former, even if the latter remains contested. ECJ control over the content
of EU law is all that appellate review requires. For example, in a
hypothetical world in which the ECJ's primacy doctrine were rejected in
favor of the GFCC's position, many important matters would remain
under the control of the member states, regardless of EU law to the
contrary." On those matters, a ruling on EU law would fall before the
National Identity Under the Lisbon Treaty, 48 CoMMON MKT. L. REV. 1417 (2011) (discussing
arguments that the Lisbon Treaty's provision of respect for national identity provides a rationale
for limits on primacy).
332. For a discussion of some of the issues raised by the debate over primacy, see Wells,
supra note 25, at 769-74.
333. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
334. Cf Editorial Comments, supra note 299, at 966-68 (distinguishing between the issue
of whether member state courts may disobey ECJ rulings on EU law and the issue of primacy and
showing that recognition of a duty to obey does not imply primacy).

335. See BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, June 30, 2009, paras. 202, 204, 216-17, 225. For example,
paragraph 249 states that German law requires member state control of "citizenship, the civil and
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primacy of member state law. But the ECJ would remain the ultimate
authority on the content of EU law, just as the state courts in the United
States have ultimate control over state law, despite the supremacy of
federal law.33 6 As applied to the GFCC's May 5, 2020 ruling, the ECJ
would have the power to review and reverse the GFCC holding that the
bond buying violated the Treaty. But the GFCC would not, as an
implication of that hypothesized reversal, be precluded from ruling that
the German Central Bank was forbidden by German law from
participating in the purchases. Germany would also not be precluded from
asserting that its law overrides EU law on the point, or from ordering the
German Central Bank to comply with the GFCC ruling, or from leaving
the European Union in the event the conflict could not be resolved.3 37
The point of distinguishing between (a) and (b) is to exclude the
primacy issue from a discussion of whether to adopt an appellate review
model because it is beside the point. If the arguments advanced above in
favor of appellate review are strong enough to justify a shift from the
current preliminary reference practice, that change can be made without
resolving the primacy issue in the ECJ's favor. Primacy can be left to one
side, to be debated on its merits and in the context of specific measures,
without allowing it to unduly influence the appellate review-preliminary
reference issue.
V.

CONCLUSION

Besides the "network" and "appellate review" alternatives examined
in this Article, a third approach to the issues raised by EU law in member
state courts is to do nothing, to maintain the status quo. Some analysts of
EU law favor a version of interpretive pluralism, in which member state
courts are not subject to ECJ review of their EU rulings. Instead, in this
version, member state courts may rule as they please on EU issues, the
ECJ may disagree when and if the issue comes to it, and disagreements
may persist, at least up to a point and for a significant period of time, as to
the military monopoly on the use of force, revenue and expenditure ... and all elements of
encroachment that are decisive for the realization of fundamental rights, ...
the shaping of
circumstances concerning the family and education, the ordering of the freedom of opinion, press
and of association and the dealing with the profession of faith or ideology." See also Luke Dimitrios
Spieker, Framing and Managing ConstitutionalIdentity Conflicts: How to Stabilize the Modus
Vivendi Between the Court of Justice and National ConstitutionalCourts, 57 COMMON MKT. L.

REv. 361 (2020).
336. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
337. TEU, supra note 26, art. 50 ("Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the
Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.").
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the meaning of the Treaty of the European Union, the Treaty on
Functioning of the European Union, and other aspects of EU law. The core
idea of this type of interpretive pluralism is that each member state has its
own culture and values, that the interpretation of EU law can turn on
culture and values, and that disparities across the European Union as to
the content of EU law are a positive feature of the European Union, not a
shortcoming.338
In the United States, this idea was put to rest by the holding in
Hunter's Lessee that upheld Supreme Court review of state court
judgments. Since the ECJ cannot review member state court judgments,
the notion of unbounded interpretive pluralism flourishes in academic
debate over the relations between the European Union and the member
states, with both champions and detractors.3 39 In some ways, this version
of interpretive pluralism resembles the Supreme Court's practice of
allowing an issue to "percolate" in the lower courts before addressing it.
In this way, the Court can learn from a variety of perspectives a diverse
array of lower courts brings to bear on the issue. Since the Court chooses
whether and when to address an issue, differences may persist for many
years." But the similarity is misleading. The premise underlying
percolation is that the Supreme Court will have the final say on the content
of federal law, when the Court decides the time is right. Interpretive
pluralism allows differences between the ECJ and a member state court to
remain in place, with no definitive resolution.
Both the "network" and the "appellate review" models described in
this Article reject unbounded interpretive pluralism, because its costs
outweigh its benefits. The benefit is the leeway currently afforded the
member state courts. The costs include sacrificing Osborn'sprinciple that
a federal forum should be available for federal issues, foregoing the
opportunity to further the process of EU integration, and leaving member
state courts' rulings on EU law in a kind of limbo, in which they determine
outcomes but lack legitimacy. The EU legal system as a whole would
provide better guidance and inspire more confidence if a single court were
truly, and not just formally, in charge of EU law, even if that court

338. See Davies, supra note 276, at 323-34; cf TEU, supra note 26, art. 4 (providing that
the European Union "shall respect" the member states' "national identities, inherent in their
fundamental structures, political and constitutional").
339. For such debate over interpretive pluralism, see, e.g., the essays collected in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON LEGAL PLURALISM AND EU LAW, supranote 276.
340. See Seinfeld, supra note 152, at 118.
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sometimes makes mistakes.34 ' One of the objections to Supreme Court
review in Hunter's Lessee was that the Court might abuse its power.
Justice Story responded that, "[fJrom the very nature of things, the
absolute right of decision, in the last resort, must rest somewherewherever it may be vested it is susceptible of abuse."3 42
For the past several decades, the European Union has relied largely
on the European Commission to implement its policies. 343 In the long run,
the realization of EU goals will likely require reliance on the member
states and their courts.3 44 If the member states and the leaders of the
European Union are content to maintain the current federal-state balance,
interpretive pluralism may serve the EU's needs well enough, with
occasion interventions by the European Commission to correct systematic
defiance of EU norms by member state courts.3 4 5 If, however, the
overriding goal of the European Union is "an ever closer union among the
peoples of Europe,"3 46 the role of EU law will grow larger, disputes
between national courts and the ECJ will become more frequent, and
persistent disagreements will become less tolerable. Adjustments to
current EU judicial federalism will be needed. Sooner or later, those
adjustments should include ECJ appellate review of member state
judgments, and perhaps eventually a network of lower EU courts as well.

341.
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